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ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL 
The short answer to the jurisdictional question raised by Suzanne, based on David's 
having filed a Petition for Relief under federal bankruptcy law in the United States District Court 
for the District of Nevada in July of 1995, is that David's bankruptcy trustee, through the 
trustee's legal counsel, has now formally stipulated in a filing with the bankruptcy court where 
David's bankruptcy is pending, to allow David to continue to pursue the present appeal. This 
is evidenced by a copy of said Stipulation as filed with the bankruptcy court, under tab 15 
attached hereto. 
This Stipulation is expected to result in a formal order of the bankruptcy court approving 
said Stipulation, to be entered in the near future. As soon as available, a copy of that order will 
be provided to this Court by way of supplementation. 
Consistent with his position from the beginning, David has formally given his agreement 
to hold the bankruptcy estate harmless from any possible adverse effects of this appeal, as shown 
in his affidavit filed with the Nevada Bankruptcy Court in support of the Stipulation referred to 
above. See, copy of affidavit at tab 16 hereto. 
Thus, the arguments of Suzanne as to the claimed lack of jurisdiction for failure of the 
trustee to formally join in this appeal are now moot, even apart from the policy reasons for 
David being able to pursue this appeal on his own, as previously set forth in his Memorandum 
dated April 17, 1996, filed herein in opposition to Suzanne's Motion for Summary Disposition, 
which arguments are incorporated by reference. The bankruptcy trustee has now confirmed his 
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position that the right to pursue the present appeal belongs to David by abandonment of any 
residual interest the trustee may have heretofore had in this proceeding. 
This Court should proceed to entertain and hear the merits of this appeal. 
II. 
DAVID DID MARSHALL THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
Suzanne and her counsel improperly seek procedural refuge from having to address the 
merits of this appeal and from having these matters remanded, by wrongfully claiming that 
David did not properly marshall the evidence. 
A review of David's opening brief will show that he did marshall the evidence as to each 
major point addressed in his argument, including appropriate references to the record 
summarizing any testimony or other evidence from Suzanne and her counsel which might exist 
as it related to the particular topic in question. Suzanne's responsive brief seems to be 
improperly suggesting that evidence which Suzanne presented on other matters, not the focus 
of the appeal, also should have been presented in David's opening brief. Such is not the law. 
A careful review of the ten supposed examples where it was claimed David did not 
marshall the evidence show that the examples do not withstand scrutiny. Virtually all of the ten 
so-called examples improperly exaggerate or distort David's stated position, the evidence relating 
thereto, or both. Six of the ten so-called examples address matters which are simply peripheral 
to the major points addressed in David's opening brief. A more detailed examination of each 
of the ten examples addressed at pages 12 through 15 of Suzanne's brief, in the order there 
addressed, here follows: 
1. The first example related to the duration of the marriage. Suzanne's Brief at 
p. 12. Suzanne claims the marriage "was almost a seven (7) year marriage." Id. Suzanne's 
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Brief mischaracterizes the statement at page 6 of David's brief which states: "After a marriage 
of about three and one-half years, David filed an action for divorce from Suzanne on April 22, 
1992, . . . "by transforming it into the misstatement that "David Watson claims this is a three 
and one-half year marriage, . . . ." The statement in David's opening brief is entirely accurate 
as to the time during the marriage when the divorce action was first filed, and that brief also 
correctly noted that the bifurcated decree granting the divorce of the parties was entered on 
January 4, 1995. Opening Brief at p. 10. The opening brief also properly recites that David's 
marriage to Suzanne occurred in September of 1988. Opening Brief at p. 13. Thus, from start 
to formal finish, the entire duration of the marriage was only 6.3 years, not "almost 7" as 
contended by Suzanne. However, there was no inaccuracy in David's statement that formal 
divorce proceedings began barely more than three and one-half years into the marriage. 
2. Suzanne's next claimed example related to her accounting for the horse business. 
Suzanne's Brief at p. 12. Suzanne claims that "the trial court found that the accounting was 
proper and accepted it." Id,, citing paragraph 22 of the Court's Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
reproduced in David's Appendix at tab 13, R. at 1555. That finding states as follows: 
By order of the Court on June 2, 1992, defendant [Suzanne] was deemed 
responsible for the horse business that was started by the parties during their 
marriage. Defendant sold the horse [sic] and accounted for the business 
expenses, the net loss of the business was $3,097.58 which loss defendant should 
bear. The Court finds that liquidation of the horse business was proper. 
While the Court thus acknowledges that there has been some form of accounting by the 
defendant, what the Court finds "proper" is not the accounting itself, but the objective of 
liquidating the horse business. In fact, later scrutiny of trial exhibits 47 and 48 which 
supposedly constituted the proof of Suzanne's claimed "loss" in operating the horse business, 
54179.WA859.1 3 
do not support that conclusion, but show instead a profit of at least $20,000.00, being very 
conservative.1 
When Suzanne's counsel moved for the admission of Trial Exhibits 48, the report she 
generated on her home computer of all her expenses which she presented for the first time at 
trial, David's counsel objected that it was too late and not adequate. R. at 1988 [Tr. tr. at 284]. 
Suzanne's counsel then stated "We're trying to account now, and counsel is objecting." Id. 
The Court received the exhibit "as illustrative" of Suzanne's testimony, noting that if he did not 
so permit it, David and his counsel would not even have that limited form of accounting. R. at 
1988-1989 [Tr. tr. at 284-285]. 
The Court was aware that the court-appointed certified public accounting firm of Gilbert 
& Stewart had been unable to adequately analyze any accounting for the horse business operated 
by Suzanne for 1993, notwithstanding her having provided them bank statements and other 
1
 At trial, Suzanne did not testify directly as to whether she made or lost money on her 
operation of the horse business, nor did she give the dollar numbers later included in her 
counsel's proposed findings, which were accepted by the court without any apparent detailed 
critical review. Had the trial court done so, it would have found that trial exhibit 47, offered 
by Suzanne, understates the revenues from sale of horses there listed by $2,000.00, a clear 
arithmetical error, bringing that total up to $63,375.00, without any additional income 
attributable to the horse operation, which she admitted also existed in her proposed finding no. 
22.4 (reproduced at tab 7 of David's appendix). If Suzanne's trial testimony (R. at 1908-09 [Tr. 
tr. at 196-97]) was correct about the sale prices of NS Quest and Quemis Supreme, then exhibit 
47 was further understated by another $900. Trial exhibit 48, which purports to show all 
Suzanne's expenses, has the handwritten notation on its first page that the total ranch expenses 
were $41,935.04. That number includes everything categorized by Suzanne in her exhibit as 
a ranch expense, and more, including some items which David disputes as being expenses 
properly attributable to the horse operation. Cross examination concerning this exhibit was 
crippled by it not having been produced before trial. There is no explanation anywhere in the 
record how Suzanne and her counsel arrived at the claimed number of $71,763.56 for total ranch 
expenses as set forth in Suzanne's proposed finding no. 22.5 (at tab 7 of David's appendix), 
which the trial court accepted. 
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records, because of the confusing way in which Suzanne kept her records. R. at 1918-20, 1923-
26 [Tr. tr. at 214-216, 219-222] and Trial Exhibit 34. In relevant part, that Trial Exhibit states 
as follows: 
We were asked by the Court to audit all income, expenses, and financial 
transactions of both parties to this case, including the business known as Flying 
"N" Stables that is currently being operated by Defendant as well as Plaintiffs 
medical practice and < rher investments and business activities and submit a 
detailed report. 
We have reviewed all financial documents delivered to our office by the 
[sic] both parties, as well as other information we requested. 
We were able to satisfy ourselves that the farm income and expenses 
shown in the 1992 individual tax return are accurate and agree with the records 
available for that year, however a complete document trail does not exist to 
reconstruct the activity ourselves, or to prepare an accounting for the 1993 year. 
Mrs. Watson maintains four bank accounts representing business and personal. 
Several of the months' statements are missing, and it is difficult for us to know 
what expenses are business and what is personal. 
Since this business activity generates very little revenue, the Defendant could only 
make and hide money on the sale of remaining horses and assets. If this were a 
concern to the Court an inventory of the assets would need to be taken by 
someone familiar with the business, . . . . 
The court-appointed CPAs were able to reconcile David's finances and found no evidence 
that he had been hiding anything. Id. 
Also, review of the June 1992 order (R. at 103-104, t i l , reproduced at tab 1 of David's 
Appendix) reveals that Suzanne was ordered to "operate the business known as the Flying 'N' 
Stables subject to accounting for its profit or loss." She was not ordered to liquidate the horse 
business as she claims in her brief at page 12. 
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The HYPP genetic defect in the parties' breeding stallion was not a rumor, but was a 
verified fact (R. at 1051-1074) which Suzanne claims she herself was sharing with prospective 
buyers of horses bred out of that stallion. R. at 2011-14 [Tr. tr. at 307-310]. Suzanne further 
attempts to insinuate that the hay which David sold was done improperly. Suzanne's brief at 
p. 12. Neither Suzanne nor her attorney have ever shown that that sale of three-year-old hay 
which was starting to mold after Suzanne had vacated that property and removed the horses 
therefrom, was in any way improper. R. at 2126-27, 2142-43 [Tr. tr. at 438-39]. 
3. Suzanne's third example relates to the purported abuse by David of his children. 
While it is true that such allegations had earlier been made by Suzanne and at least some of the 
children, as referenced in Suzanne's brief, newly available evidence shows that this was all 
manufactured, as David has always contended. R. at 1087-88, f f's 4-5. Criminal investigators 
never found enough corroborated evidence to file or otherwise pursue any charges against David. 
The preliminary "substantiation" which DFS found for believing David had abused his children 
is now discredited in light of new information, including that the person signing the petition for 
DFS now disavows any personal knowledge of such claimed "substantiation." See exhibit 21 
hereto, which relates to Juvenile Ct. Record at 66-70. 
Those children that have been out of Suzanne's custody and control long enough to feel 
comfortable have all recanted those allegations, and made it clear that the earlier allegations of 
abuse against David were falsely made in an effort to please their stepmother Suzanne, who then 
had custody of them, in order to survive without further mistreatment at Suzanne's hands. See 
attached copies of complaints filed by Justin Watson (Exhibits 17 and 18 hereto), who turned 
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20 earlier this year, and affidavit of Scott Watson2 (Exhibit 19 hereto), who is still a minor but 
has been living with a foster family since the summer of 1994, until his recent reunion with his 
father after further investigation by the Utah Department of Child and Family Services and 
Scott's Guardian ad litem cleared such a reunion (Exhibit 20 hereto).1 
Scott was age 16 at the time of the divorce trial, and then resided with a foster family 
where he had lived for almost a year, and told the court he desired to testify at the trial, but the 
trial judge denied him that opportunity after a brief record interview with him alone in 
chambers, without counsel present. R. at 2084-92 [Tr. tr. at 380-88]. The trial judge thus 
followed his long-standing personal rule to never allow a minor child to testify in any divorce 
proceeding, despite the age and desire of this 16-year-old to testify as to conduct of his 
stepmother, and the identity and location of assets she secreted, although the trial judge noted 
that Scott appeared to be a bright and articulate young man. Id. 
4. Suzanne's fourth example suggests that David merely sought "additional hearings 
to rehash old orders." Suzanne's Brief at p. 13. What Suzanne ignores was David's recent loss 
of employment, which began in late March of 1994, and which provided an appropriate basis 
for modification of earlier orders. R. at 1161-62, f l ' s 3-4. David was never allowed by any 
2The substance of Scott's Affidavit has been verified by properly administered polygraph 
testing in late September 1996. As Scott recites at f 18 of his Affidavit, he recanted the false 
allegations against his father David, by reporting that recantation to DFS and others, before he 
ever was able to resume contact with his father beginning in late 1994. Most of what David 
knows about these matters, he has only learned since the Spring 1996. 
3It is recognized that the trial court did not have these attachments, or the others appended 
hereto, at the time of trial in April of 1995, as these attachments only came into being in 1996. 
They are included only as support for the statements made concerning the substance of the 
matters they address, to assure this Court of the factual basis for these later developments. 
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court to adequately present that information until the trial which occurred over a year later in 
April of 1995. Opening Brief at pp. 8-10. Another primary focus of David's unsuccessful 
attempts to obtain timely court review of a changed situation related to the court's refusal to 
enforce against Suzanne the earlier orders requiring her to provide ongoing accounting for her 
operation of the horse business. R. at 1171 (David's Appendix at tab 3, items (4)-(7) of Motion 
and Order to Show Cause). 
It simply does not matter that other hearings on other issues were held at other times, 
mostly predating the new matters for which David sought appropriate court review. 
5. Suzanne's fifth example relates to the one-seventh interest in a St. George 
timeshare which David purchased before the marriage. Suzanne's Brief at p. 13. Citing only 
the reference in the opening brief at page 13 to that interest, ignoring the later further 
explanation at page 22 of the opening brief, and further ignoring the material set forth at the 
pages referenced on both pages of the opening brief, Suzanne then misreports, at least in part, 
the record, stating that it "shows that during the marriage the St. George condominium was paid 
by marital funds and additional shares purchased." Suzanne's Brief at 13. Only the middle of 
the five references to the transcript cited by Suzanne had anything to do with that matter, and 
the description by Suzanne on page 310 of the trial transcript added nothing to the more 
complete information already cited by David in his opening brief, referring to pages 98 through 
104 of the trial transcript. 
Suzanne never controverted David's testimony that the first interest, originally a one-
eighth interest later converted to a one-seventh interest when one partner dropped out, was 
purchased by David in 1984 for $5,000.00 with subsequent payments of approximately 
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$2,500.00 per year made in each of the succeeding four or five years prior to the marriage, 
coupled with similar payments for another five years during the marriage, together with the 
further sum of $22,000.00 David borrowed from his line of credit secured by his equity in the 
Loafer Canyon Road home in 1993, which mostly went to acquire a second one-seventh interest. 
Id. David's opening brief correctly describes and refers to the relevant pages pertaining to that 
matter. Only one additional share in that timeshare property was purchased during the marriage, 
not plural "additional shares'' as alleged in Suzanne's brief. This was done with Suzanne's 
consent while the parties were attempting reconciliation. R. at 1885 [Tr. tr. at 104]. David 
only claims an offsetting credit for the premarital portion of this asset, and recognition that the 
1993 payment of $22,000 came out of another premarital asset, David's Loafer Canyon home. 
6. Suzanne's sixth example pertains to the selection of Gail Stringham as therapist 
for the children. Suzanne's Brief at 13. Citing only the first passing reference in the opening 
brief at page 8, Suzanne's brief ignores the more comprehensive explanation of that matter found 
at page 32 of the opening brief, wherein David cited relevant portions of Ms. Stringham's 
testimony. In what appears to be a non sequitur, Suzanne then assumes that the trial court must 
have based its order requiring David to pay a bill to the therapist selected contrary to the 
provisions of an applicable court order, on the judge's purportedly having "obviously accepted 
the testimony of Dr. Stringham that this was not in the best interest of the children because the 
children claimed that their father had abused them." Suzanne's Brief at 13. The page of the 
transcript cited by Suzanne in support of this states, in relevant part, only as follows: 
Q. There has been some discussion prior to your testimony that Mr. Watson 
has refused to pay these debts. Is that your understanding? 
A. Yes, it is. 
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Q. And he has testified that he has refused to pay them because he had no input into 
the therapy. 
A. That's my understanding, yes. 
Q. In the case of the therapy that's involved here, would it have been beneficial to 
your patients to have Mr. Watson involved in this therapy? 
A. In my professional opinion, no. 
Q. During the therapy sessions, were there things disclosed that would create an 
adverse relationship between Mr. Watson and his children? 
A. Yes, there were. 
Q. And were those things subsequently reported to Child Protective Services? 
A. Yes, they were. 
R. at 2031 [Tr. tr. at 327]. Not only does Suzanne's brief distort and exaggerate the trial 
testimony, but it also furthers a fraud on the judicial system by so doing, as evidenced by Scott 
Watson's recent affidavit, attached hereto at tab 19,at paragraphs 12-13 and 17, which read as 
follows: 
12. On one occasion when I told the counselor about the abuse I was receiving 
from Suzanne, Suzanne was called into the room and I was told by the counselor 
that I just "couldn't push Suzanne too far" or words to that effect. I was then 
sent home with her and was beaten by her. On the way home from counseling 
she told me no one would ever believe me since she had talked to people at DFS 
when Justin was placed in foster care and she said it was justified to beat me up 
if I deserved it. 
13. The counselor I told about Suzanne beating me in paragraph 12, was at the 
Stringham Clinic. After being beaten up by Suzanne after telling the counselor 
Suzanne beat me, I never reported the abuse again even though it continued 
frequently. 
17. I made the false allegations against my father to avoid beatings and abuse 
from my stepmother, Suzanne Nebeker. I have previously told counselors at the 
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Stringham Clinic, at Rivendell and DFS counselors and caseworkers that the 
allegations I made against my father were false. 
7. Suzanne's seventh example relates to the money she received for the equity from 
the sale of her home in Alpine, Utah. Suzanne's Brief at 14. Suzanne there falsely accuses 
David of ignoring her trial testimony to the purported effect that he "partially admitted that these 
funds had been given to him to invest for Suzanne Nebeker and that he had never returned 
them." Citing pp. 268 and 418 of the trial transcript. Suzanne's brief totally ignores the more 
extended treatment of this matter on page 20 of the opening brief where David referred to 
Suzanne's testimony that she gave her sales proceeds to David to invest for her. David cited 
the Record at 1972, which is the same page 268 of the trial transcript. David's next sentence 
in the opening brief is supported by a citation to page 2122 of the Record, which is page 418 
of the transcript. Suzanne's brief totally ignores the proper record citations which David 
provided in his opening brief and distorts the more complete and accurate picture related by 
David in his brief. 
8. Suzanne's next example relates to the use of the proceeds from the sale of David's 
premarital Provo condominium as a partial down payment of the 32 acres Lakeshore property. 
Suzanne's Brief at 14. Without ever directly contradicting David's testimony on this point, 
Suzanne's brief claims that David never denied "that those funds were commingled with marital 
funds so that they could not be traced to the sale of the Provo condominium." Id., citing the 
trial transcript at 317-318. Those pages of the trial transcript do not address the matter of the 
sales proceeds of the condominium, but rather the money which Suzanne received from the sale 
of her Alpine, Utah home. 
Also on those pages of the transcript, Suzanne states her view that marital income was 
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commingled and expresses her opinion that there was no way to determine what was done with 
this money from this account [the $30,000.00 plus from the sale of her Alpine home] because 
with David's different accounts, uhe would pull from one source to another and pool funds. 
And so it would be very difficult to trace that." Even if dollar for dollar "tracing", as opposed 
to matching amounts, were as difficult as Suzanne contended, which David does not concede, 
it still makes no difference so long as the same amount is applied elsewhere. 
Suzanne's generalized statement of lay opinion, which does not even mention or refer to 
the Lakeshore property, coupled with the absence of other more direct testimony from Suzanne 
addressing the source of the down payment for the Lakeshore property, is simply not enough 
to overcome David's clear and specific testimony supported by documents exchanged prior to 
trial, that the sale proceeds of his Provo condominium premarital property or an equivalent 
amount were entirely put into acquiring the Lakeshore property. See Opening Brief at pp. 23-
24. 
9. Suzanne's next example related to David's earnings. Suzanne's Brief at 14. 
Suzanne's brief distortedly claims that David stated that "his peak earnings during this marriage 
were $300,000.00" when the opening brief instead stated: "During the marriage, David 
experienced his peak earnings from his medical practice, earning more than $300,000.00 per 
year," citing Trial Exhibits 7 through 9, David's personal income tax returns for the years 1991, 
1992 and 1993. Those exhibits show that David's adjusted gross income for federal tax 
purposes was $362,493 in 1991, $314,988 in 1992, and $419,734 in 1993. 
Suzanne, citing to the tax returns of David's professional corporation, then emphasizes 
the gross receipts of that entity, ignoring the substantial and legitimate expenses of that medical 
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practice, including salaries paid to six certified registered nurse anesthetists, which greatly 
reduced David's personal income. Suzanne further ignores David's loss of employment in early 
1994, which she caused, which unemployment continued for more than a year until well after 
the trial. Suzanne also mistakenly attributes his personal gross salary of 1993, before it was 
adjusted for various losses, to the year 1994 when his gross personal medical income, before 
adjustments for losses, was $128,500.00. R. at 1875 [Tr. tr. at 62-63]. 
10. Suzanne's final unfounded attempt to show a lack of marshalling also distorts both 
David's brief and the Record. Suzanne's Brief states: 
David Watson claims that he could not find employment (Watson's Brief at 16), 
however, the evidence was that Mr, Watson could have obtained immediate 
employment as an emergency room doctor starting at $80,000.00 a year. [Citing 
trial transcript at 338-40.] 
What David's opening brief really said was: 
"During that time [March 1994 until trial in April 1995] David attempted with 
reasonable diligence to find employment elsewhere as an anesthesiologist without 
success due to the declining demand nationwide for anesthesiology services. 
. . . As of the time of trial, David had not been successful in finding new employment 
in anesthesiology, his field of medical practice for more than 15 years. 
Opening Brief at 16. 
Furthermore, the trial testimony cited by Suzanne nowhere addresses what an emergency 
room doctor makes. The testimony referred to was Suzanne's hearsay statement, based on 
conversations with unidentified resident physicians she claimed to know, that salaries for family 
practice and some anesthesia residents ranged "up to $80,000.00 per year." R. at 2043-44 [Tr. 
tr. at 339-40]. 
David testified at trial that he seriously doubted that any resident could make as much 
as $80,000.00 per year and expressed his belief that residents make somewhere in the 
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neighborhood of $2,000.00 to $3,000.00 per month, admitting that he had not then specifically 
checked that out. R. at 1901 [Tr. tr. at 165]. However, he was clearly in a much better 
position to know the income of residents than was Suzanne. 
David's post-trial memorandum in support of his motion for reconsideration or for a new 
trial, based on later investigation, pointed out that the actual income of residents at the nearest 
teaching facility to Utah County (the University of Utah) was in the range of $31,125.00 to 
$38,700.00. R. at 1517, reproduced at tab 11 of Appendix, p. 4. 
Moreover, Suzanne's brief ignores the fact that the trial court's improper imputation of 
income to David, because he was not voluntarily unemployed, was not a point that was a focus 
of David's appeal brief. 
As to all rulings which David challenged in the argument section of his opening brief, 
he did adequately marshall the evidence. The distortions in Suzanne's brief of both David's 
brief and of the evidence at trial do not justify any conclusion of claimed inadequate marshalling. 
Suzanne's brief fails in its attempt to sidestep the merits of the points raised by David in this 
appeal. 
in. 
SUZANNE'S BRIEF DOES NOT ADEQUATELY MEET 
OR CHALLENGE THE MERITS OF DAVID'S BRIEF AS 
TO IMPROPER VALUATIONS AND ALLOCATIONS 
MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Largely sidestepping the specific errors addressed in David's opening brief, Suzanne's 
brief, at pages 16 to 22, primarily quotes excerpts from the trial transcript, most of which was 
expressly referred to and summarized in David's opening brief. Suzanne's brief offers little or 
no substantive analysis or other rebuttal of the specific trial errors identified in David's opening 
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brief. A more complete response to the points made in Suzanne's brief here follows. 
A. Suzanne's Prior Home in Alpine, Utah 
Suzanne's brief offers no analysis of this point, but only recites portions of the trial 
testimony already referred to in David's opening brief. Trial Exhibit Nos. 52 and 53 clearly 
showed that the entire net proceeds of $32,470.26, which Suzanne received from the sale of her 
Alpine home in November of 1991, were all deposited into her separate checking account at Far 
West Bank on November 20, 1991. Trial Exhibit 53 also shows a check written the next day 
for $20,000.00, which David testified he received as reimbursement for the horses he had then 
recently purchased for $22,500.00 at Suzanne's request, as David's brief earlier explained at 
page 20. R. at 2122 [Tr. tr. at 418]. Despite Suzanne's general testimony that she gave her 
sales proceeds to David to invest for her (R. at 1972 [Tr. tr. at 268]), Suzanne never offered 
any documentation showing that more than the $20,000.00 reimbursed to David for the horse 
purchases were ever transferred to him, and David is aware of no such documentation, because 
he only received the one $20,000.00 reimbursement. 
More importantly, Suzanne does not deny David's primary point relating to the Alpine 
home, namely, that Suzanne has received double credit for her equity from that home. She 
caused the home sale proceeds to be spent on horses and other items never adequately accounted 
for and then claimed the same home sale proceeds financed most of the down payment for her 
new home in Lehi, purchased after the parties final separation, at a time when she still had sole 
use of the Loafer Canyon Road home. Particularly in light of Suzanne's retention at the time 
of trial of all horse sale proceeds and her retention of at least one horse purchased with the 
proceeds from the sale of her Alpine home, this double counting justifies a new review at the 
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B. David's Loafer Canyon Road Home 
Again as to this point, Suzanne's brief only quotes verbatim excerpts of the trial 
testimony, the substance of all of which was summarized in David's opening brief with 
references to the trial transcript sections later quoted by Suzanne. 
Suzanne's brief totally ignores the points of David's brief that the $355,000.00 principal 
cost of originally constructing that home, without interest on substantial loans, before the minor 
remodeling done during the marriage of the parties, accounted for essentially all of the market 
value of the home as it was believed to exist at the time of trial. The home later sold for only 
$365,000.00 in May of 1996, $20,000.00 less than what was believed to be the value of the 
home at the time of trial, and $10,000.00 more than the original principal amounts, without 
interest, paid for the home years before the marriage and before any remodeling. See opening 
brief at p. 21 and Exhibit 22 hereto evidencing the 1996 sales price. 
Suzanne also totally ignored and failed to address the fact that David's premarital 
residence on Loafer Canyon Road was also used to secure each of the listed marital assets 
described in David's opening brief which were acquired during the marriage. Suzanne's silence 
on this point can only be construed as acquiescence to the factual accuracy of the points made 
in David's brief at pages 20 to 23 addressing those points. Given those facts, it clearly follows 
that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding to Suzanne any marital interest in the Loafer 
Canyon Road home. 
This conclusion is also supported by the opinion of this Court in Cox v. Cox, 
877 P.2d 1262, 1269 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that it is proper for the trial court to attempt 
54179 WA859 1 16 
to restore parties to their premarital status where the marriage is of short duration, the couple 
marries later in life, when there are no children born to the marriage). See also Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981) (affirming provisions of a divorce decree putting the 
parties to a "second marriage of relatively short real duration" back into sole ownership of the 
properties they brought into the marriage). 
While admittedly one child was born to Suzanne and David during the three and one-half 
years they lived together before the divorce proceedings began, they both came into the marriage 
relatively well established in life, each having had children by an earlier marriage, each having 
been employed during the early part of the marriage. Given that Suzanne left the marriage (her 
third) with a replacement home, had resumed gainful employment with a substantial income, and 
that David remains responsible for paying child support for that one child of their marriage, 
there is no reason the same analysis applied in those cases is not equally applicable here. The 
parties' marriage (David's second, at age 42 in 1988, after being a widower for 3 1/2 years 
following a first marriage of 16 years) was of fairly short real duration, discounting the time the 
divorce proceedings dragged on. 
C. Thirty-two (32) Acre Lakeshore Havfield Property 
The key point here is that $29,000.00 of the purchase price of this property came from 
David's separate premarital assets, for which the trial court gave no offsetting recognition in 
splitting the proceeds of the sale of that property equally between the parties. Opening brief at 
pp. 23-24. 
In response, Suzanne's brief, without directly challenging the factual accuracy of David's 
trial testimony, which was supported by documentation exchanged between the parties prior to 
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trial, attempts to insinuate that David's testimony as to the source of funds to acquire the 
Lakeshore property is suspect, given that no documents were submitted to the trial court at the 
time of trial to corroborate that unchallenged testimony. Suzanne's brief at p. 21. Under those 
circumstances, David's trial counsel apparently saw no need for further corroboration. 
Suzanne also cites her opinion trial testimony to the effect that marital revenues were co-
mingled and that it would not be easy to trace what David did with his money generally. Id. 
This latter point ignores the analysis of David's finances performed by the court appointed 
certified public accountants who were readily able to follow and track the accounting work done 
by David's personal CPA in the regular course of business. Those court appointed experts said 
there was no evidence that David did anything to hide his funds. Trial Exhibit 34. That exhibit 
showed it was the many personal accounts of Suzanne which were impossible to track without 
more help from her due to her intermingling of personal and horse expenditures. 
Suzanne's weak response, which does not directly challenge the accuracy of David's 
unrebutted trial testimony, is insufficient to allow the trial court's findings to remain. 
David also cited this Court's opinion in Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022-23 (Utah App. 
1993), for the proposition that special supplemental findings specifically justifying a departure 
from the normal rule that contributions of separate property to a marital asset should first be 
reimbursed out of sale proceeds before dividing the remainder between the parties. Opening 
Brief at p. 24. Suzanne's brief totally ignored and did not address this governing Utah law. 
The trial court's failure to follow that law requires remand of this matter for further review at 
the trial court level. 
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D. Payson Ranch House Property 
Suzanne's brief properly notes that David claims he is entitled to offsets because the 
purchase of the ranch property was financed in part by his line of credit secured by his 
premarital Loafer Canyon home. Suzanne's Brief at p. 21. Losing sight of the fact that said 
financing was done before divorce proceedings began, her brief incredulously asserts that David 
would have had no debts if he had followed the court's orders. Id. 
This became impossible once David found himself unemployed, and unable to obtain any 
relief from the courts to modify the earlier orders requiring him to pay all the debts of the 
parties. David had no choice but to create new debt once he exhausted his available accounts 
receivable, in order to pay the prior debt as ordered. In relevant part, the Order of June 3, 
1992, based on David's then large and growing income and other circumstances as they then 
existed, which order was not changed in any relevant way thereafter, required as follows: 
19. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay the marital debts as he listed them on the exhibit 
given to the court, a copy of which is attached hereto. They total $15,866.29 per month. 
[Not including temporary alimony of $800.00 per month and child support of $1,300.00 
per month for each of Scott, Lindsay and McCade, for an additional $4,700.00 per 
month - per 1f's 20 and 21 of same order]. The Plaintiff is ordered to make those 
payments and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. [Bracketed material added] 
Record at 101, t t 19-21 reproduced at tab 1 of David's Appendix. 
Furthermore, the assumed market value of the ranch property at the time of trial was 
believed to be $360,000.00 based on a then pending offer which ended up falling through. 
When that property sold in March of 1996, the total sales price was only $325,000.00, 
$35,000.00 less than assumed at the time of trial. See Exhibit 23 attached hereto. Furthermore, 
instead of an assumed equity of $106,000.00, the total net proceeds of that sale were only 
$47,054.55, before deduction of any amount owed to David for his having contributed proceeds 
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of his premarital assets to acquire the property. Id. Deliberately ignoring those later 
developments, Suzanne's brief strongly and incorrectly implies that the trial court's projected 
equity in that ranch property of $106,000.00 was later split between Suzanne and David's 
bankruptcy trustee, when in reality they received $59,000.00 less than projected at trial. Id, 
E. Debts 
At page 23 of Suzanne's brief, she improperly and misleadingly suggests that debts which 
should have been paid from the sale of assets had not been paid. In fact, as a review of the trial 
transcript cited readily shows, comparing that testimony to the listing of debts (in Trial Exhibit 
23) attached to the June 1992 Order, every one of the items mentioned were debts that were 
retired properly, either from the sale of the asset financed by the debt, or by David using his 
own income to pay those debts. Nothing was improper about any of that. David did not 
misapply any such funds as the record shows. By contrast, Exhibit 48 shows that Suzanne used 
more than $11,000.00 of proceeds of the horse sales to acquire another car, which she put in 
her own name, at a time she already had two other vehicles. 
Furthermore, Suzanne's brief persists in comparing the debts as they existed in 1992 or 
1993 with the expected sales proceeds in 1995, which is like comparing apples and oranges, or 
grapes and shriveled raisins. Suzanne again entirely sidesteps the case law cited at page 27 of 
David's opening brief to the effect that valuations, including both assets and liabilities, should 
be made as of the time of trial, citing Morgan v. Morgan, 859 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah App. 1993). 
While Suzanne's obfuscating techniques may have confused the trial court, and helped persuade 
it to make the clearly erroneous findings it did, this Court should not be similarly blinded to 
what really happened. 
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Finally, Suzanne totally ignores the clear typographical and mathematical errors identified 
at pages 26 and 27 of David's opening brief. These various mistakes by the trial court cry out 
for rectification on remand. This Court should allow that to occur. 
F. Accounts Receivable 
Again, Suzanne's brief totally ignores the points made in David's opening brief relating 
to his accounts receivable. Instead, Suzanne simply lists the approximate amount of the gross 
corporate medical practice collections over the seven months immediately following the final 
separation of the parties, without subtracting the medical practice expenses related to those 
collections which had to be deducted before one could arrive at any personal income figure for 
David. There is no dispute as to the amount of David's income at various times. What both 
the trial court and Suzanne's brief failed to address is the fact that by the time of trial, the 
remaining accounts receivable were so negligible in amount and so old (more than one year) and 
uncollectible that it was clearly evident David had no accounts receivable which he could collect 
in any material amount. That is because for just over a year prior to trial, David was not adding 
anything to those receivables, but was continually drawing them down to pay debt and ongoing 
living expenses, including those pertaining to his ongoing job search. 
Suzanne's brief misleadingly states at page 24 that David was not paying child support 
or alimony at a time not clearly specified. David did in fact pay alimony and child support as 
previously ordered directly from his own income until after he became unemployed. Suzanne's 
Trial Exhibit 48 acknowledges she received more than $29,000.00 in alimony and child support 
from September 1993 through March 1994. Thereafter, the juvenile court, by order dated May 
20, 1994, authorized child support payments to be paid out of $30,000.00, plus interest thereon 
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of $471.35, held in the trust account of Suzanne's legal counsel. All of that money was paid 
to Suzanne as Trial Exhibit 50 shows. Had the money been applied only for support of the two 
children of David of which Suzanne had custody from April of 1994 forward, those funds were 
sufficient to cover all child support at the original level set through the end of March of 1995 
and part of April 1995, as shown by David's proposed Findings of Fact at page 32, reproduced 
in David's Appendix at tab 6. In spite of David's unemployment for the last year before trial, 
the trial court refused to retroactively reduce any of that support obligation, notwithstanding 
David's prior efforts to obtain a modification. Record at 1496, f 11. 
David again submits that only assets which he owned, as they existed at the time of the 
divorce trial in April of 1995 can be credited to him. Assets or liabilities from one and one-half 
to almost three years earlier, which were no longer accurate, simply had lost their relevance. 
IV. 
THE NEW TRIAL MOTION WAS PROPER AND WELL FOUNDED 
David's post trial motion filed in response to the court's Memorandum Decision of May 
26, 1995 was styled both as a Motion for Reconsideration, and in the alternative, a Motion for 
a New Trial. While it is generally true that motions for reconsideration are not proper, "it is 
settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final 
order or judgment." Ron Shepherd Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994), 
citing Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). 
In the case at bar, no final order or judgment had been made and it was a proper 
procedural filing to ask the trial court to reconsider some of its proposed findings before they 
were finalized. 
Moreover, a motion entitled as one for reconsideration, which could also properly be 
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brought under another rule, such as Rule 59, is allowed to be reviewed. Watkiss & Campbell 
v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1991). Certainly David's motion so qualified, 
particularly because it was also entitled a Motion for New Trial and did expressly cite to Rule 
59 as one of the bases for the court to take further action. Record at 1506, 1518-19, reproduced 
at tabs 10 and 11 of David's Appendix. Accordingly, the Motion and supporting Memorandum 
were proper subjects for review by the trial court. 
Suzanne's brief persists, at page 24, in making misleading comparisons. While Trial 
Exhibit 3 does show that the total estimated value of all property of both parties at the time of 
the trial was $1.8 million, which later events showed to be too high, it also showed total debts 
of a little more than $900,000.00 against that, not including attorney fees owned to counsel on 
both sides. Of the net remaining equity of both sides of under $900,000.00, $385,000.00 was 
tied up in David's professional corporation's profit sharing plan and $11,700.00 in his individual 
retirement account, which as a practical matter were not available to him for present use, 
because he had previously used up most of his ability to borrow from that plan, and he would 
incur significant penalties to withdraw other funds. Thus, even based on the over optimistic 
asset valuations used at the time of trial, after deductions for attorney fees, there was less than 
$500,000.00 available to be divided between the parties, excluding David's retirement funds, 
in which funds the court did provide for an allocation to Suzanne. Given that the vast majority 
of those assets were attributable to what David brought to the marriage, and considering he had 
four children by his prior marriage compared to Suzanne's one child from a prior marriage, even 
a quick surface view of what was fair and equitable would have resulted in David receiving more 
of the net assets available for distribution than Suzanne. Yet, Suzanne's brief acknowledges an 
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award in her favor of more than $300,000.00. While David submits she received more than she 
acknowledged, she was not entitled to even such a large sum as she does concede she was given. 
However, this over simplified comparison should not undercut the several serious errors 
committed by the trial court in valuing and dividing the assets of the parties, as explained above 
and also in David's opening brief and even in the Memorandum supporting the original Motion 
for New Trial. David's Appendix at tab 11. That Motion for New Trial properly presented the 
facts pertaining to the matters addressed above, and others, and deserved to be granted. This 
further error of the trial court left David no practical alternative but to file bankruptcy in order 
to better protect his ability to preserve the remaining assets, both for himself and for Suzanne, 
given his inability at the time to service the remaining debt on the real property and other assets. 
V. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
David has raised serious and substantial questions concerning the propriety of the rulings 
of the trial court. The appeal is not frivolous, nor was it filed for purposes of delay. David 
would not have incurred his own substantial attorney fees on appeal, given his limited financial 
circumstances, where there not a legitimate basis to pursue the questions presented. Suzanne's 
brief does not even attempt to analyze how this appeal fits the definitions of Rule 33(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Indeed, there is no basis to make this appeal fit those bases 
for an award of attorney fees in favor of Suzanne. 
Rather, it is Suzanne's brief, which because of its distortions of the record and of David's 
position and lack of analysis, that has caused needless increase in the cost of this appeal and 
should therefore be considered one interposed for the purpose of delay under Rule 33(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. David requests his attorney fees as it relates to the 
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preparing of this Reply Brief because of that. Cf., Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987) 
(appeal in a domestic action was found frivolous where there was no basis for the argument 
presented and the evidence and the law were mischaracterized and misstated). 
CONCLUSION 
This court should remand for a new trial all issues concerning the valuation and allocation 
of the assets and debts of the parties, with directions to give David appropriate credit for his use 
of his separate assets in funding the acquisition of marital assets. The prior rulings of the trial 
court on those matters should be vacated. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUEST REAFFIRMED 
David respectfully submits that oral argument will facilitate a proper decision of this 
matter by providing an opportunity for the Court to receive clarification of the matters addressed 
by this appeal, given its lengthy and complex history, both procedurally and substantively. 
l9fK Respectfully submitted this I 6 day of November, 1996. 
j(rtin K. Mangum ^ 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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VIA HAND DELIVERY 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Follow-up to Reply Brief In David W. Watson v. Suzanne Watson nka Suzanne 
Nebeker, Appellate Case No. 960174-CA 
Dear Clerk: 
On behalf of my client, Appellant David W. Watson, I am hereby enclosing a conformed 
copy of the Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada filed 
December 20, 1996 in Dr. Watson's bankruptcy proceeding there pending. That Order confirms 
the right of Dr. Watson to proceed with the present appeal addressing property aspects of his 
Utah divorce. This represents the follow-up promised on page 1 of Dr. Watson's Reply Brief, 
under heading No. I. It confirms the stipulation evidenced by tab no. 15 of the Addendum to 
Dr. Watson's Reply Brief, which Reply Brief was dated and filed November 18, 1996. This 
Order also relates to and confirms the appropriateness of the order of Judge Orme in this appeal 
dated November 26, 1996, filed the next day. 
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Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
December 27, 1996 
Page 2 
An original and seven copies of the conformed Bankruptcy Court Order are enclosed 
herewith. Should there be any reason why the judges of the Utah Court of Appeals need or 
desire anything more pertaining to this matter, please advise. 
Sincerely, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
John K. Mangum 
JKM/ck 
Enclosure 
cc: David W. Watson (without enclosure) 
C. Robert Collins (with enclosure) — ^ C*j>)e^ 
Douglas Haymore (with enclosure) 
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ENTERED ON DQC'S^' 
WILLIAM M. O'MARA, ESQ., #837 
311 E. Liberty Street 
Reno, Nevada 89501 
(702) 323-1321 
Attorney for Debtor 
RECEIVED AND FILFn 
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PATRICIA GRAY. CLERK 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OP NEVADA 
In Re: BK-N-95-31148 
(Chapter 7) 
DAVID W. WATSON, M.D. 
Debtor. ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL ABANDONMENT OF 
LAWSUITS AND APPROVAL OF 
STIPULATION OF DEBTOR AND 
TRUSTEE 
This matter of the motion for partial abandonment of 
lawsuits having come on for hearing this 4th day of December, 
1996, and the Debtor, DAVID WARREN WATSON, and JAMES PROCTOR, 
Trustee in bankruptcy, having entered into a stipulation, and Good 
Cause Appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for partial 
abandonment of lawsuits and authority to proceed with the Utah 
divorce appeal be granted and the stipulation related thereto be, 
and hereby is, approved. 
DATED: December J2J&, 1996. 
GREGG W. ZIVE 
U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
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WILLIAM M. O'MARA, ESQ., #837 
311 E. Liberty Street 
Reno, Nevada 89501 
(702) 323-1321 
Attorney for Debtor 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
In Re: 
DAVID W. WATSON, 
Debtor. 
/ 
BK-N-95-31148 
(Chapter 7) 
STIPULATION RE: DEBTOR'S 
REQUEST FOR PARTIAL 
ABANDONMENT OF LAWSUITS 
AND CONSENT TO DEBTOR'S 
CONTINUATION OF STATE 
COURT APPEAL 
Hearing Date Uao £Of fi*U 
Hearing Time 2 -co 
Time Required: 
COMES NOW, DAVID W. WATSON, Debtor herein, by and through 
his counsel, WILLIAM M. O'MARA, ESQ., and JAMES PROCTOR, Trustee in 
Bankruptcy, by and through his counsel, WILLIAM VAN METER, ESQ., of 
VAN METER & MATTEONI, and stipulate as follows: 
1. That on July 6, 1995, Judge Ray Harding signed the 
Supplemental Divorce Decree between David Warren Watson and Suzanne 
Watson in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for the State 
of Utah. 
2. That on July 7, 1995, David W. Watson filed his 
Petition in bankruptcy. 
3. That on July 11, 1995, Judge Harding had caused to be 
filed the signed Supplemental Divorce Decree. 
4. That on August 10, 1995, David W. Watson, in pro per, 
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filed his original Notice of Appeal in the Utah Divorce case. 
5. That on February 13, 1996, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Bert 
Goldwater held that the Utah State Divorce Decree between David W. 
Watson and Suzanne Watson was valid and recognizable in the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
6. The Trustee in Bankruptcy has taken no action to 
prohibit David W. Watson from appealing in the State of Utah 
divorce case, nor does he object to the Debtor pursuing that 
appeal. 
7. That on September 18, 1996, Debtor amended his 
Petition in Bankruptcy adding five (5) potential lawsuits, the 
operative facts of which were unknown to the Debtor at the time of 
filing his bankruptcy Petition. Those lawsuits as further 
identified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by reference made a 
part hereof are too burdensome to the Bankruptcy Estate to pursue 
in view of the present assets of the Bankruptcy Estate. 
8. That David W. Watson wishes to pursue these lawsuits 
identified in Exhibit "A" as well as continue to pursue the divorce 
appeal, and has been advised by Utah State legal counsel that, in 
their opinion, such suits are viable under state law of Utah. 
9. The Debtor has requested that the Bankruptcy Estate 
abandon these assets pursuant to 11 USC § 554. 
10. That David W. Watson will hold the Bankruptcy Estate 
harmless of all liability, including, but not limited to, attorney 
fees and costs of suit. 
11. The parties to this Stipulation are in agreement 
that the proceeds of each lawsuit, if any, shall be split as 
follows: 
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A. First, reimbursement to David W. Watson or 
payment of all costs and attorney fees incurred by David W. 
Watson in the suit; 
B. Second, payment of thirty-four percent (34%) of 
the remaining proceeds of the recovery to Jim Proctor, Trustee 
in Bankruptcy, up torpayment in full of all prinmpalg^ebts 
owed in the Bankruptcy (said principal debt shall not accrue 
interest); and 
C. Third, payment of all the then remaining 
proceeds to David W. Watson. 
12. The Trustee has no opposition to David W. Watson 
pursuing his appeal of the Utah divorce case entitled, "Watson v. 
Watson", Case No. 924400816, and any other action which may arise 
from the underlying fact of said action or from the facts arising 
out of the prosecution or defense of said or associated actions, 
but that should he be successful and obtain additional assets or 
reduction of debt, said additional assets shall become property of 
the Estate and any debts reduced in the appeal or subsequent new 
trial and a final judgment reached shall likewise be adjusted in 
his bankruptcy case. 
DATED 
VAN METER d MATTEONI 
BY %4& 
IAM M . 0'MARA 
ILL I AM VAN METER/ ESjQ . 
Attorney for Trustee 
i, ESQ. 
Attorney for Debtor 
20. Other contingencies and unliquidated claims of every nature, 
etc. 
Potential Lawsuits 
A. David W. Watson, M.D. vs. 
Samuel McVey, Chet Loftis, 
Lorin Barker, Jeff Skobie, 
Daniel Goods, Thomas Wail 
and Kirton B. McCorkie 
Fraud and Legal Malpractice 
General Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
Punitive Damages may be in 
excess of $100,000 
B. David W. Watson, M.D. vs. 
Gale Stringham, Jerri Aldredge, 
Ph.D., Aspen Wellness Center 
and other related/associated 
clinics 
Fraud and Medical Malpractice 
General Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
Punitive Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
C. David W. Watson, M.D. vs. 
Riverdale Psychiatric Hospital 
Medical Malpractice and 
Alienation of Affection 
between Dr. Watson and his 
son, Scott Watson 
General Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
Punitive Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
D. David W. Watson, M.D. vs. 
State of Utah, Division of 
Family Services, Department 
of Human Services 
Failure of Investigation, 
libel and slander, 
alienation of affection 
General Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
Punitive Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
E. David W. Watson, M.D. vs. 
Suzanne Nedeker 
Slander, libel, alienation of 
affection; misuse of legal 
process 
General Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
Punitive Damages in excess 
of $100,000 
The operative facts giving rise to these potential lawsuits 
took place prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, but were 
unknown to Debtor until results of recent investigation were made 
known to the Debtor. 
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WILLIAM M. O'MARA, ESQ., #837 
311 E. Liberty Street 
Reno, Nevada 89501 
(702) 323-1321 
Attorney for Debtor 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
In Re: 
DAVID W. WATSON, M.D. 
Debtor. 
BK-N-95-31148 
(Chapter 7) 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR AUTHORITY TO 
PURSUE LAWSUITS, APPEAL 
AND FOR PARTIAL ABANDONMENT 
OF LAWSUITS BY TRUSTEE 
/ 
DAVID W. WATSON, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says under penalty of perjury. 
1. That Affiant is the Debtor in the above-entitled 
matter and is competent to testify. 
2. That subsequent to the filing of this bankruptcy, 
Affiant, in preparing for the appeal in the divorce/property 
division case and in consultation with other attorneys admitted to 
the Utah State Bar and licensed to practice in Utah, and in 
receiving testimony and evidence from others, including, but not 
limited to, Affiant's sons, has been advised that lawsuits against 
various persons and entities as listed in Amended Schedules are 
viable. 
3. That Affiant has discussed the substance of these 
lawsuits with Mr. Proctor, Trustee, and his attorney, Mr. Van 
Meter. Both Mr. Proctor and his attorney, Mr. Van Meter, have 
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indicated a reluctance to travel to Utah to prosecute these 
lawsuits. 
4. That Affiant believes, and therefore alleges, that 
after the consultations above referenced, the lawsuits are of 
substantial value to the estate and should be pursued. 
5. That Affiant believes the percentage to the 
Trustee/Estate after payment of costs and attorney fees are just 
and fair to the Trustee, the unsecured creditors and the Debtor. 
6. That Affiant believes the property division of the 
Utah Court was unfair and not in conformance with either the facts 
or Utah law. The Affiant has appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
the State of Utah with the understanding that all assets recovered 
will become property of the estate. Suzanne Nebeker has raised the 
issue of lack of jurisdiction by reason of the fact that Affiant 
has not sought permission from the Trustee or Bankruptcy Court for 
pursuing the appeal, i.e., the automatic stay. 
7. Affiant has been advised that the automatic stay is 
only directed toward creditors and does not affect the Debtor's 
right to pursue the appeal. The Affiant has notified both the 
Trustee and his counsel not only of the appeal but of its progress. 
Neither has indicated that Affiant needs permission or the Court's 
authorization. Further, Affiant is seeking the return of assets 
from Suzanne Nebeker which are not presently subject to the 
Bankruptcy Court, but will become property of the estate upon any 
reversal. 
8. The Affiant is paying his attorney fees and costs for 
the appeal outside of the bankruptcy estate and the estate is held 
harmless from any of such claims. 
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9. While Affiant does not believe an Order is necessary 
to pursue the appeal, it is requested for the benefit of the Court 
of Appeals of the State of Utah. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DAVID W. WATSON, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN t o be fo re me 
> < l a y ol t h i s ay f October , 1996. 
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Douglas S. Haymore II #6568 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
352 S. 200 W. #4 
P.O. Box 741 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
(801) 451- 7000 
Fax 451-7270 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUSTIN PHILLIP WATSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUZANNE NEBEKER, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Civil No. ^ ^ a g e r w 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Judge: 
Plaintiff, Justin Watson, by and through his counsel, Douglas S. Haymore II of the law 
firm of NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES, hereby complains of Defendant, Suzanne Nebeker as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Justin Watson (Justin) is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
1 
2. Defendant, Suzanne Nebeker, is an individual residing in Grand County, State of Utah. 
3. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4. That at all conduct by defendant relevant to this complaint occurred at times between 
September 2, 1988 and March 24, 1994, inclusive. 
5. That Ms. Suzanne Nebeker was the stepmother of Justin. 
6. That all conduct of defendant which is complained of in this complaint occurred when 
Mr. Justin Watson was a minor child. 
7. That Mr. Justin Watson was born on May 19, 1976 and is now an adult and brings this 
complaint on his own behalf. 
8. That Ms. Nebeker did on various occasions tell Justin words to the effect that she 
would castrate him, break various bones, break his neck, and kill him. 
9. That Ms. Nebeker did on various occasions hit, kick, punch, slap, beat, with her own 
body and weapons, and otherwise assault and batter the minor child Justin to so violently as to 
cause physical damage to organs of Justin's body and so violently also to cause Justin to bleed 
externally and internally. 
10. That as these events were traumatic to the minor child, Justin, and happened 
repeatedly, Justin is unable to state with specificity the date and place of all such occurrences. 
11. That one occasion when such events as those in t 8 and 9 occurred was, to the best 
2 
recollection of Justin, in the fall of 1990 in the then family home of 11075 South Loaffer 
Canyon Drive, Salem Utah. One of the brothers of Justin had taken an extra Pudding Cup® to 
school for lunch and defendant mistakenly believed that Justin had committed the "crime". 
Defendant so violently beat Justin that he suffered partial hearing loss due to the concussion 
caused by one of defendant's hits to Justin's ear. 
12. That one occasion when such events as those in if 8 and 9 occurred was, to the best 
recollection of Justin, in the fall of 1991 in the then family home of 11075 South Loaffer 
Canyon Drive, Salem Utah. Justin was confronted by defendant for "staffing school" more 
than twenty times. Justin maintained that he had only "staffed" once. Defendant insisted that 
Justin was lying and so violently beat him that he curled up in the fetal position on the floor. 
Defendant is trained in the Marshal arts and used kicks and moves from her training on the 
child, to include but not limited to, repeated kicking in the rib cage when the boy was curled 
up on the floor attempting to survive the beating. During the course of this beating defendant 
drop kicked the boy in the groin with such force as to lift him off the ground. 
13. That one occasion when such events as those in S 8 and 9 occurred was, to the best 
recollection of Justin, in the fall of 1989 again in the family home. The sister of the defendant 
accused Justin of stealing a calculator. While defendant was on the telephone being informed 
by the mother of a class mate of Justin that he had borrowed the calculator to accomplish a 
home work assignment, she was simultaneously yelling and beating the child who, was on the 
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floor beside the bed in the master bedroom. 
14. That one occasion when such events as those in f 8 and 9 occurred was, to the best 
recollection of Justin, in the fall of 1989 in the family home. Justin and one of his natural 
brothers were heard bemoaning the fact that they were forced to do the chores of defendant's 
son by a previous marriage. Defendant beat both boys but the majority of her wraith was 
unleashed on Justin in the form of full kicks to the ribs as he lay on the floor. This beating was 
so severe that the boy urinated blood for some time after. 
15. That one occasion when such events as those in f 8 and 9 occurred was, to the best 
recollection of Justin, at the Salt Lake County Fair Grounds during the Salt Lake County fair 
of 1991. Defendant attacked Justin as he returned to the R.V. that the family was staying in 
during the fair. Defendant forced Justin to remove his clothes to his underwear as she was 
repeatedly flailing him with punches, kicks and generally beating him. She grabbed a belt 
with a western style buckle and swung it at the boy so that he was being flogged by the 
buckle. During the course of this beating she purposely grabbed the scrotum of the boy in her 
hand and crushed it telling him , in effect, that she'd castrate him and then see if he'd be able 
to go out and chase women. The bruises that Justin sustained from this beating were extreme 
and visible on his face and other parts of his body. 
16. That one occasion when such events as those in 1 8 and 9 occurred was, to the best 
recollection of Justin, when the boy was in the 6th grade. He had given a ring or bracelet that 
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belonged to defendant to a school " girl friend". When defendant found out about this she 
became enraged and drug the child down the stairs, in to the car and drove him some distance 
which took more approximately twenty minutes to the girl's house to retrieve the piece of 
jewelry. During the whole drive she was slapping and beating the boy who was seated in the 
front passenger seat. During the course of this beating the child sustained a bloody lip and 
other contusions on the face. 
17. That on numerous occasions the child was forced to stay in a basement room with no 
or little heat, during the winter, with only one blanket. Justin did suffer extremely from the 
cold on such occasions. 
18. That on occasions when Justin was confined to the basement room, defendant did 
deprive him from adequate food and water for extended periods of time, some times exceeding 
one day. Justin suffered from such hunger that he was forced to covertly stash food from the 
family food storage in his room. 
19. That on one occasion when defendant found that Justin was keeping food in his room, 
she severely beat him for "stealing". 
FIRST CAUSE QF ACTION: 
ASSAULT AND BATTERY 
20. Justin repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 19 above with the same force and 
effect as though set forth in full herein. 
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21. That as a result of the actions of defendant described above, Justin lived in constant 
fear of eminent bodily harm from the defendant, his stepmother and did suffer physical and 
mental abuse at the hand of the defendant. 
22. That as a result of the conduct of defendant Justin is reasonably certain to continue to 
suffer, physical and mental pain and trauma, to include but not limited to, damage to the 
organs of his abdominal cavity and permanent partial hearing loss, headaches, stomach aches, 
and blackouts. 
23. That as a result of the actions of the defendant Justin spent much of his teenage years in 
various state care facilities for youth and he was deprived the love and association of his 
natural family. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION QF EMQTIQNAL DISTRESS 
24. Justin repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 23 above with the same force and 
effect as though set forth in full herein. 
25. That the defendant's conduct toward Justin was intentional and reckless. 
26. That the defendant's conduct toward Justin was extreme and outrageous. 
27. That the defendant's conduct proximately caused Justin emotional distress and physical 
harm. 
28. That the defendant's conduct proximately caused Justin extreme and severe emotional 
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distress and physical harm. 
29. That as a result of the conduct of defendant Justin is reasonably certain to continue to 
suffer, physical and mental pain and trauma, to include but not limited to, damage to the 
organs of his abdominal cavity and permanent partial hearing loss, headaches, stomach aches, 
and blackouts. 
30. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has experienced , and is reasonably 
certain to continue to experience, personality disorders which have adverse effects on his life. 
31. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has incurred and is reasonably 
certain to incur medical expenses for therapy, care and other professional services. 
32. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant Justin has limited educational 
advancement and will incur substantial lost opportunities as a result and is reasonably certain 
to incur large expenses to complete his educational progress. 
33. That as a result of the actions of the defendant Justin spent much of his teenage years in 
various state care facilities for youth and he was deprived the love and association of his 
natural family. 
34. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant, Justin experiences depressed earnings 
and earning potential and is reasonably certain to continue to experience depressed earnings 
and earning potential until such time as he incurs substantial sums to remedy the situation. 
THIRD CAUSE QF ACTION: 
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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
35. Justin repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 34 above with the same force and 
effect as though set forth in full herein. 
36. That defendant's conduct toward Justin was negligent. 
37. That defendant's conduct toward Justin was extreme and outrageous. 
38. That the defendant's conduct proximately caused Justin emotional distress and physical 
harm. 
39. That the defendant's conduct proximately caused Justin extreme and severe emotional 
distress and physical harm. 
40. That as a result of the conduct of defendant Justin is reasonably certain to continue to 
suffer, physical and mental pain and trauma, to include but not limited to, damage to the 
organs of his abdominal cavity and permanent partial hearing loss, headaches, stomach aches, 
and blackouts. 
41. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has experienced , and is reasonably 
certain to continue to experience, personality disorders which have adverse effects on his life. 
42. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has incurred and is reasonably 
certain to incur medical expenses for therapy, care and other professional services. 
43. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant Justin has limited educational 
advancement and will incur substantial lost opportunities as a result and is reasonably certain 
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to incur large expenses to complete his educational progress. 
44. That as a result of the actions of the defendant Justin spent much of his teenage years in 
various state care facilities for youth and he was deprived the love and association of his 
natural family. 
45. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant, Justin experiences depressed earnings 
and earning potential and is reasonably certain to continue to experience depressed earnings 
and earning potential until such time as he incurs substantial sums to remedy the situation. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant as follows: 
1. For medical expenses in an amount which will fully compensate him for past 
and future injuries and damages which will be enumerated and supplied to the Defendant and 
proved at trial; 
2. For a judgment for interest from the date of accrual of this action for cost of 
this suit, expert witness fees, and for such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper; 
3. For past and future lost income and /or wages; 
4. For general, special and compensatory damages in an amount in excess of ONE 
MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000.00); 
5. For Punitive Damages in an amount in excess of ONE MILLION, FIVE 
HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,550,000.00); 
6. For cost of Court herein; 
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7. For interest at the highest legal rate; 
8. For reasonable attorneys fees; and 
9. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury of all issues in this action triable of right by jury, 
and submits herewith the statutory jury fee. 
DATED this BL day of May, 1996. 
NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
try J ,^ 
Douglases. Haymfrre II 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
Compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 10(a): 
As inclusion of Plaintiffs name and address here 
is an often ignored format requirement, 
Plaintiff request that he be allowed to withhold 
his address as he fears physical harm 
if defendant were in possession of that information. ~nov. 
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Phoenix, AZ., 85032 
(602) 788-7227 
SEP 5 1996 
By Deputy Clerk 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUSTIN PHILIP WATSON, 
Plaintiff, 
SUZANNE NEBEKER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER CHANGING VENUE, 
CONSOLIDATING FILES, ETC., 
Case Number 90090335-9"~CV 
%e4-C,3£ 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the undersigned 
judge of the above entitled court on the date written below, the 
court having reviewed the files and records herein, Defendant's 
Motion for Change of Venue, Defendant's Motion to Consolidate and 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss First Cause of Action, and the 
court having reviewed the motions and memoranda in support of 
each motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Change of 
Venue, and Defendant's Reply Memorandum on Venue and the court 
deeming itself fully advised, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. Venue in this action shall be and is hereby transferred 
to the Fourth District Court for Utah County, at Provo. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-13-11, the Clerk of this 
Court shall transfer all pleadings in the action to the Fourth 
District Court at Provof Utah. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-13-11, Plaintiff shall pay 
the cost of transferring this action to the Fourth District Court 
within 10 days of the entry of this order or this action shall be 
deemed dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
4. So long a Plaintiff complies with the requirements of 
Utah Code §78-13-11 within 10 days, then Defendant may submit a 
request to the Fourth District Court to decide Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss Count One. 
5. This action shall be consolidated with Case Number 
960903358 entitled JUSTIN PHILIP WATSON v. DON NEBEKER in this 
court which case is assigned to Judge J. Dennis Frederick. Venue 
in Case Number 960903358 has also been transferred to the Fourth 
District Court pursuant to order of Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on August 19, 1996; to: 
Douglas S. Haymore, III 
Attorney at Law 
380 North 200 West, #260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
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Douglas S. Haymore II #6568 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
352 S. 200 W. #4 
P.O. Box 741 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
(801)451-7000 
Fax 451- 7270 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUSTIN PHILLIP WATSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON NEBEKER, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Civil N o r ^ ^ g ^ O 3 3 £ g £ V 
Jui 3BDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Plaintiff, Justin Watson, by and through his counsel, Douglas S. Haymore II of the law 
firm of NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES, hereby complains of Defendant, Don Nebeker as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Justin Watson (Justin) is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant, Don Nebeker, is an individual residing in Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4. That at all conduct by defendant relevant to this complaint occurred at times between 
September 2, 1988 and March 24, 1994, inclusive. 
5. That Mr. Don Nebeker was the step grandfather of Justin because Mr. Nebeker is the 
father of Ms. Suzanne Nebeker who was the stepmother of Justin. 
6. That all conduct of defendant which is complained of in this complaint occurred when 
Mr. Justin Watson was a minor child. 
7. That Mr. Justin Watson was born on May 19, 1976 and is now an adult and brings this 
complaint on his own behalf. 
8. That Mr. Nebeker did on various occasions tell Justin words to the effect that Mr. 
Nebeker was adept at the Marshal arts and able and willing to kick Justin's ass, break Justin's 
neck or legs, and kill Justin. 
9. That as these events were traumatic to the minor child, Justin, and happened 
repeatedly, Justin is unable to state with specificity the date and place of all such occurrences. 
10. That one occasion when such threats as those in % 8 where made by Mr. Nebeker was 
the first day that Justin was in the defendant's "new house" in American Fork, Utah and a 
younger half brother of Justin found and pulled out a "secret stash" of Mr. Nebeker's beer and 
chewing tobacco. This was approximately December of 1991. 
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11. That Mr. Nebeker on the same day referenced in t 10 did have a conversation in his 
green house with Justin in which he said words to the effect that even though he knew his 
daughter was beating Justin, if Justin even raised his hand to touch her in his own defense Mr. 
Nebeker would "break your legs" and "kill" Justin. 
12. That during the conversation referenced in t 11 Defendant was not referring to Justin 
by his name but repeatedly addressed the minor child, Justin, as "Fucker" and "You Fucker". 
13. That on March 24, 1994, after Justin had given testimony in case no. 924400816; a 
highly contentious divorce proceeding between Dr. David Watson, Justin's father, and Ms. 
Suzanne Nebeker, the defendant did, while entering the elevator in the Fourth District Court 
House for Utah County , State of Utah, Provo Department make his hand into the shape of a 
gun which he pointed at Justin, figuratively fired and said to Justin words to the effect that 
"I'll deal with you latter"; he bent the thumb forward and then raised the index finger, 
ostensibly the barrel of the pistol, to his lips where he feigned blowing the smoke off the end 
of the barrel and then looked Justin in the eyes and then told the boy "I'll deal with you 
latter". 
14. That on one occasion Defendant did brutally kick, beat, and torture the dog of the boy 
Justin, explaining to Justin that such was appropriate behavior when disciplining the dog and 
Defendant made it clear to the boy that such was also appropriate when disciplining an unruly 
child. 
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15. That on numerous occasions the defendant did have menacing discussions about guns 
with Justin. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
ASSAULT 
16. Justin repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 15 above with the same force and 
effect as though set forth in full herein. 
17. That as a result of the actions of defendant described above, Justin lived in constant 
fear of eminent bodily harm from the defendant and his stepmother. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
18. Justin repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 17 above with the same force and 
effect as though set forth in full herein. 
19. That the defendant's conduct toward Justin was intentional and reckless. 
20. That the defendant's conduct toward Justin was extreme and outrageous. 
21. That the defendant's conduct proximately caused Justin emotional distress. 
22. That the defendant's conduct proximately caused Justin extreme and severe emotional 
distress. 
23. That as a result of the conduct of defendant Justin is reasonably certain to continue to 
suffer, physical and mental pain and trauma. 
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24. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has experienced , and is reasonably 
certain to continue to experience, personality disorders which have adverse effects on his life. 
25. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has incurred and is reasonably 
certain to incur medical expenses for therapy, care and other professional services. 
26. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant Justin has limited educational 
advancement and will incur substantial lost opportunities as a result and is reasonably certain 
to incur large expenses to complete his educational progress. 
27. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant, Justin experiences depressed earnings 
and earning potential and is reasonably certain to continue to experience depressed earnings 
and earning potential until such time as he incurs substantial sums to remedy the situation. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
28. Justin repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 27 above with the same force and 
effect as though set forth in full herein. 
29. That defendant's conduct toward Justin was negligent. 
30. That defendant's conduct toward Justin was extreme and outrageous. 
31. That defendant's conduct proximately caused Justin emotional distress. 
32. That as a result of defendant's conduct, Justin has experienced, and will continue to 
experience severe physical trauma including, but not limited to, headaches, stomach aches, and 
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blackouts. 
33. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant, Justin has suffered, and is reasonably 
certain to continue to suffer, physical and mental pain and trauma. 
34. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has experienced , and is reasonably 
certain to continue to experience, personality disorders which have adverse effects on his life. 
35. That as a result of the conduct of defendant, Justin has incurred and is reasonably 
certain to incur medical expenses for therapy, care and other professional services. 
36. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant Justin has limited educational 
advancement and will incur substantial lost opportunities as a result and is reasonably certain 
to incur large expenses to complete his educational progress. 
37. That as a result of the conduct of the defendant, Justin experiences depressed earnings 
and earning potential and is reasonably certain to continue to experience depressed earnings 
and earning potential until such time as he incurs substantial sums to remedy the situation. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant as follows: 
1. For medical expenses in an amount which will fully compensate him for past 
and future injuries and damages which will be enumerated and supplied to the Defendant and 
proved at trial; 
2. For a judgment for interest from the date of accrual of this action for cost of 
this suit, expert witness fees, and for such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper; 
6 
For past and future lost income and /or wages; 
4. For general damages in an amount in excess of TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($250,000.00); 
5. For Punitive Damages in an amount in excess of FIVE HUNDRED AND 
FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($500,000.00); 
6. For cost of Court herein; 
7. For interest at the highest legal rate; 
8. For reasonable attorneys fees; and 
9. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury of all issues in this action triable of right by jury, 
and submits herewith the statutory jury fee. 
DATED this _Qfday of May, 1996. 
NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
Dou^aTs. H ^ o r e ^ ^ 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
Compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 10(a): 
As inclusion of Plaintiffs name and address here 
is an often ignored format requirement, 
Plaintiff request that he be allowed to withhold 
his address as he fears physical harm 
if defendant were in possession of that information. 
• ^TE OF UTAH ) 
f ILO) 1H _ 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE Of UTAH 
UTAH COUHTV i^|T> T^-i TXT A 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah Bar #5455 
13444 North 32nd Street, #9 
Phoenix, AZ., 85032 
(602) 788-7227 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUSTIN PHILIP WATSON, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER CHANGING VENUE 
t^Wwytt 
Case Number $€&9&3tt8r CV 
Judge J . Dennis Freder i ck 
DON NEBEKER, 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the undersigned 
judge of the above entitled court on the date written below, the 
court having reviewed the files and records herein and the 
Memorandum of Defendant, Plaintiff having not timely responded, 
and the court deeming itself fully advised, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. Venue in this action shall be and is hereby transferred 
to the Fourth District Court for Utah County, at Provo. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-13-11, the Clerk of this 
Court shall transfer all pleadings in the action to the Fourth 
District Court at Provo, Utah. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-13-11, Plaintiff shall pay 
the cost of transferring this action to the Fourth District Court 
within 10 days of the entry of this order or this action shall be 
deemed dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
4. So long a Plaintiff complies with the requirements of 
Utah Code §78-13-11 within 10 days, then Defendant may submit a 
request to the Fourth District Court shall to decide pending 
motions which include, a Motion to Dismiss Count One, a Motion to 
Consolidate and a Motion to Compel Discovery, 
5. Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant his reasonable 
attorneys fees in connection with the motion pursuant to Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in the sum 
i\M — I CERTIFY 
Dated this / /J>day of August, 1996.ORIGINAL 
\STATE OF 
bATE 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL: 
'•COPY OF AN 
If&THE THIRD 
OUNTY, 
t . (*.-.-
THIS ORDER SHALL /BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT 
FOR SIGNATURE UNLESS TIMELY OBJECTION IS MADE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 of the Code of 
Judaical Administration within five (5) days. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on August 9, 1996; to: 
Douglas S. Haymore, III 
Attorney at Law 
352 South 200 West, #4 
P.O. Box 741 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
^H ) 
> ~S 
S e_ "YofUTM ) l{l 
- 'jo-Janso.HVjs'fiUfii^utt^i District Cour 
arc! foty^o'.*1 " i,ito« and full ocyy </. 
-xjcumsnt^n ' le if* my o»ic« as ««h Osrk. 
{r?££?Ptt%2T.#l0 C. ROBERT COLONS 
\kA B. SfalTH, Clerk 
) J oX-J(^*<~l_ \£s<y-*^£JTtexBN _ 
Tab 5 
STATE OF NEVADA ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF WASHOE ) 
Scott Watson, from first hand knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances set forth herein alleges that: 
1. I am the natural son of David Watson and Hilary 
Watson (deceased). 
2. I was at one time, the stepson of Ms. Suzanne 
Nebeker. 
3. On various occasions when I was in the care and 
custody of Suzanne Nebeker she did physically and sexually accost 
and abuse me. The physical abuse averaged five (5) times a week 
and the sexual accosting, while not occurring weekly, occurred 
several times. 
4. Due to my age and the circumstances surrounding 
events I am unable to recall with certainty the specific dates of 
events, but the following is accurate as to what occurred to the 
best of my personal knowledge and memory. 
5. One occasion when I was abused by Suzanne was in 
our family home in Salens Utah. Suzanne kicked me in the groin 
from behind. 
6. Another time Suzanne abused me was in the basement 
of Suzanne's father's house. She was yelling at me and prodding 
me in the groin with a dowel rod. 
7. Another occasion of Suzanne's abuse upon me was on 
the stairs of our house in Lehi, Utah. Suzanne grabbed and 
sgueezed my scrotum and threatened to castrate me. 
8. On various occasions, Suzanne told me that my 
father was responsible for the death of my natural mother because 
he had driven her crazy, and as a result, my mother committed 
suicide by crashing her car. 
9. On various occasions when I was being taken to 
custody evaluations and/or supervised visits with my father, 
Suzanne would coach me on what to say and not to say and how to 
act toward my father or how not to act toward my father. 
10. The last argument that Suzanne and my father had, 
I believe this took place in August 1993, I saw Suzanne before 
she went to bed. The next morning she asked me to take Polaroid 
pictures of her. I noticed that she had scratches and bruises 
around her eye and upper neck that were not there before she went 
to her bedroom by herself the night before. 
11. I felt I had to please Suzanne or I would be 
beaten and abused. At the interview at the Children's Justice 
Center I badgered my father and said things that I knew would 
upset him until he broke down. I knew if I didn't report 
successful embarrassment of my father to Suzanne I would be 
severely punished. 
12. On one occasion when I told a counselor about the 
abuse I was receiving from Suzanne, Suzanne was called into the 
room and I was told by the counselor that I just "couldn't push 
Suzanne too far" or words to that effect. I was then sent home 
with her and was beaten by her. On the way home from counseling 
she told me no one would ever believe me since she had talked to 
2 
people at DFS when Justin was placed in foster care and she said 
it was justified to beat me up if I deserved it. 
13. The counselor I told about Suzanne beating me in 
paragraph 12, was at the Stringham Clinic. After being beaten up 
by Suzanne after telling the counselor Suzanne beat me, I never 
reported the abuse again even though it continued freguently. 
14. I also told counselors at Rivendell and DFS 
counselors and investigators that Suzanne beat me. 
15. I have seen Travis, Suzanne's natural son, and 
Lindsey, my natural sister, beaten by Suzanne for various 
reasons. I have also seen McCade being slapped by Suzanne on 
various occasions when he was tired and would irritate Suzanne by 
crying or asking for things. 
16. I have made allegations against ray natural father 
which were false as a result of the duress and trauma inflicted 
upon me by Suzanne Nebeker. Each and every allegation which I 
have made in the past regarding sexual abuse perpetrated upon me 
by my father is false. 
17. I made the false allegations against my father to 
avoid beatings and abuse from my stepmother, Suzanne Nebeker. I 
have previously told counselors at the Stringham Clinic, at 
Rivendell and DFS counselors and case workers that the 
allegations that I made against my father were false. 
18. I have recanted my allegations against my father 
previous to having any contact with him after I was placed in the 
state's custody. 
19. I recanted these allegations to ray therapist Aaron 
Burdge and to DFS workers. 
20. I attended a meeting at DFS in Provo on the June 
20, 1996. At that meeting I made statements. I have had the 
opportunity to review the transcript provided to my attorney, 
Douglas Haymore, of that meeting. I hearby state under oath that 
everything I stated in that meeting is true and correct to the 
best of ray knowledge and memory. 
3 
21. Every day during the summer of 1993, I worked from 
6:00 a.m. until dark. The only time I got something to eat was 
if my father got off early and brought us dinner or took us to 
eat. Sometimes the neighbors next door, the Diamonds, would 
invite me to eat with them. If Suzanne came to the barn while I 
was next door, I would go out their back door and pretend I had 
been doing chores in the pasture or watering the horses in the 
calving pens. I would never tell Suzanne they had fed me for 
fear I would be beaten or severely punished. If I did get caught 
I wouldn't be allowed to have breakfast before going to the barn 
the next morning. 
22. For three weeks during the summer of 1993, just 
before my father left, I lived with him at his trailer in Spanish 
Fork. He made sure I had a good breakfast and supplied food so I 
could pack a good lunch and some snacks. He usually picked me up 
by 6:00 p.m.. My father had taken me to the trailer to live with 
him after Suzanne beat me up in front of the family and bloodied 
my nose. 
23. I was never allowed to have or play with my 
friends. Suzanne isolated me so I could not tell anyone what was 
going on. Suzanne was afraid that we would talk about what was 
happening. I remember when Suzanne beat up Lindsey in front of 
the family for telling "family secrets" to one of the Clayson 
girls who was baby-sitting us shortly after my father married 
Suzanne. 
24. I was often punished for things beyond my control. 
I remember the last summer in Salem when the Australian shepherd 
puppies got out. Elias, the Mexican hired hand, was working the 
horses and the puppies were in the alley in the barn. As Elias 
came to put one horse away and take another for its workout, the 
puppies would follow him in and out of the barn. After I 
finished my chores in the barn, I went to get the puppies. They 
weren't there. Suzanne got very mad, said it was my fault and 
beat me up. Suzanne said I would have to get a job and pay her 
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$300 for each puppy. I was only 14 and was devastated. 
25. When I was 13, Suzanne falsely accused me of 
playing with McCade's privates. 
26. When I was in detention after running away from 
Suzanne, she came to visit me. While Suzanne was there another 
lady came and talked with me and said she would represent me that 
day. Suzanne, my public defender and I, discussed whether or not 
I should plead guilty, at the arraignment that afternoon, to the 
charges of breaking into my own house. When she finished talking 
to me, Suzanne pulled her to the side of the room. I went with 
them and when Suzanne started telling this lady that I had 
sexually abused McCade, I walked away. A few days later people 
came from Rivendell and placed me in a unit where I was locked 
up. 
27. I pled guilty to the charges only because I knew 
that if I pled not guilty I would have to go home with Suzanne. 
28. When we went to the horse show, it was my job to 
stay overnight at the arena with the horses. If it was a show 
when my father didn't come, I would be left at the arena while 
the rest of the family went out to eat and sometimes I didn't get 
any dinner. 
29. I was often given responsibility for our stallion. 
This made me nervous especially during breeding reason. Suzanne 
expected me to give him shots by myself. If I asked for her help 
she would yell at me or beat me. 
30. I remember a horse show in Spanish Fork in 1993 
when I had the stallion. Travis was leading a mare by the stall 
as I was taking care of the stallion. The stallion bolted from 
the stall and went after the mare and I lost control of the 
horse. Suzanne chased the stallion and caught him. She then 
came after me. She was kicking and hitting me and saying I was 
worthless. I was embarrassed as several people watched me being 
humiliated. Wade Perkins intervened and told me to go hide and 
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protected me from Suzanne. After Suzanne had calmed down, Wade 
came and got me. A, 
DATED this f)\ day of July, 1996. 
Ah (ujft^ 
:OTT WATSON SCO
Affiant 
VERIFICATION 
Personally appeared before me, SCOTT WATSON, who first being 
sworn on oath stated he has read the following document, 
understands the contents thereof and knows the same to be true to 
the best of his knowledge and belief, on this O )A'J day of 
July, 1996. 
My Comm %-\TW ires: 
(U^h ,w ^lT\.HJ^^i)AlA^i(uLy 
TARY PUBLIC 
esiding at: _ \j) ihjKxLat ^ 
SUZANNE M. SPRIESTERSBACH 
Notary Public - Slate of Nevada 
Appointment Recorded in Washoe County 
MY APPOINTMENT EXPIRES JUNE 27, tt ift 
iHnmiimmH—M»MI»—win i •IIIWII MM<MH! 
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SUSAN P. DYER - #5065 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - #1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
150 East Center, Suite 5100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 371-1181 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the interest of: I MOTION TO AMEND PRIOR ORDER 
WATSON, Scott 01-22-79 Case No.862435 
Child under 18 years of age. Judge: Leslie D. Brown 
The State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services 
("DCFS"), by and through its counsel, Susan P. Dyer, Assistant 
Attorney General, hereby moves the Court to amend the May 10, 1995 
Permanency Plan Order of long-term foster care, to return the Child 
to the custody of Dr. David Watson, the Child's father. 
In support of this Motion, DCFS alleges that: 
1. On June 13, 1996, the Child was placed in the physical 
custody of Dr. Watson, and the Child did well, as more particularly 
set forth in the Court Report attached hereto and incorporated by 
this reference. 
2. The Child desires to resume living with Dr. Watson. 
WHEREFORE, the State prays for the following: 
FILED 
OCT 4 / 7 % 
Juvenile Co-
Fourth Distrru 
1. That the May 15, 1995 Permanency Plan Order of long-term 
foster care be amended to return custody and guardianship of the 
Child to Dr. David Watson, the father of the Child. 
2rV> 
DATED this <T4J day of September, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Sidsan Dyer ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
ORDER 
1. That the May 15, 1995 Permanency Plan Order of long-term 
foster care be amended to return the Child to the custody of Dr. 
David Watson, the Child's father. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Les l ie D. Brown 
Juven i l e Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on 
t h e
 csS^^day of 
September, 1996 a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
Order was mailed, postage pre-paid to the following: 
Jini Roby 
Guardian Ad Litem 
32 West Center #205 
Provo, Utah 84 601 
Laura Madsen 
DCFS Caseworker 
Dr. David Watson 
975 Robin St. 
Reno St. 
Reno, NV 89509 
Douglas P. Haymore II 
380 N. 200 W. Suite 260 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Attorney for the Father 
(i^djjAjnlMa. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am a Deputy Clerk of the above-named 
Juvenile Court, and that on the day of 1996, I 
served the foregoing signed ORDER on each of the following named 
persons, by mailing same to the following: 
Jini Roby 
Guardian ad Litems J?>£-; 
(Box at Juvenile Court) 
Laura Thompson 
DCFS Caseworker 
(Box at Juvenile Court) 
Douglas P. Haymore II 
Attorney for Father 
380 N 200 W Suite 260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Susan Dyer 
Assistant Attorney General 
(Box at Juvenile Court) 
CLERK OF THE COURT: 
xUihi yyizdte^ 
Deputy Clerk 
CQWT REPORT 
August 8, 1996 
Child: Scott Watson DOB: 22 Jan 1979 DFS Worker: Laura Thomson 
Judge: Leslie Brown 
Parent: FA: David Watson Court #: 862435 
I. QUERENT SITUATION: 
Scott is currently living at Ron and Sandra Critchfield's foster home and attended 
mainstream classes at Mountain View High School this last year. Scoxt improved his 
grades this year in school and did very well. He worked at Albertson's and was promoted 
in February. Scott has very frequent telephone contact with his father, and visited him 
over spring break, and for a few weeks earlier this summer. Scott reports that the visits 
went very well, and he has decided that he would like to return home to live with his 
father for this next school year in Reno. Scott plans to return to Reno with his father mid-
August He will return a few weeks later for his Eagle Scout court of Honor, and then 
move to Reno permanently. 
II. PPO<?FK3S ON TREATMENT PLAN: 
Physical and Mental health needs: 
Scott is seen regularly for his arthritis and continues to take medication for that 
condition. He also has seen an orthopedist, who recommended special tennis shoes for 
Scott, which have been purchased and Scott wears. Scott's father has purchased an 
orthopedic bed for him. Scott was evaluated this year with a CHEC exam, Dental, and 
MHA He had been participating in regular therapy with Aaron Burdge, who says that 
Scott doesn't need to see him anymore. Scott has progressed significantly in modifying 
his behaviors, and has succeeded in reaching his goals- He is a fine young man. 
Educational needs / visitation: 
Scott has completed the Independent Living Program. He was enrolled at 
Mountain View High School and did well in his classes. Scott had a few credits to catch 
up on in English, so he did packets this spring. He has visited his school in Reno and 
plans to enroll in the ROTC classes offered there. He hopes to make a career in aviation. 
m. REASON FOR TERMINATION: 
Scott and his father have a desire for his to return home. The issues that brought Scott into 
foster care and kept his father from being in a position to take him have been resolved. The best 
place for Scott is with his family, and fortunately, this is going to work out for Scott, 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
DCFS respectfully requests a motion to aiuend custody of Scott from DCFS to his father, David 
Watson. Scott will turn IS in January. 
Is- /A*#t / /^ 
Laura C. Thomson 
Foster Care Caseworker 
Division of Family Services 
Tab 7 
Sant by: DAVID WATSON 7023560346 08 /20 /96 21:40 Job 166 Page 2 
&U3-Q2-L * * 1^:06 FROM NEIL B. CRIST, ATTORNEY TO lTO3&t*L«b K . U * 
M U g i U D U K 
TO* Paul ClUPti* 
FftOK; Shar i* JUvar i /£n 
KBt Dr* Wat a on 
z nm w r i t i n g in respogae t o Dr* tiat#on'4 request for 
infarxwJLtiani regarding «ty »chooli;ag, credent ia l© , *ttbap*ci&J,ty 
b*c&gro*»od And t r a i n i n g , *ad tinu* en t b c job* fffeile X wna 
employed vixfc tha S t a t e of Vt*ub, I va» never aee igned t o a Wateon 
C**«. iQeo , t o t h e beat of aty r e c o l l e c t i o n , I d id n o t have a&? 
contact* wi th the tfat«on faintly or other p r o f e s s i o n a l * regarding 
t h i a family* Therefore, I do not faa l i t i * ae-caaaAry for we t o 
r«»pond t o Dr. ttetaoo'e reqitaet for luforatatioa* 
Xf yoa bav*> au*y <3ae*ttoner p leeae f e e l f r e e t o c o o t a c t w* at (304} S23-&C14 bet***n 9 am Afcd 5 pm, B&T. 
Sen t by : DAVID WATSON 7023560316 0 8 / 2 0 / 9 6 21 M5 J o b 166 Page 8 /8 
0 6 / 0 5 / 9 6 15 :15 FAI $01 074 7822 l>H<; n ^ r K P r w n c n 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Paul Curtis 
FROM: Sherie AlvuxiPr 
SUBJECT: Watson Family 
DATEi August 5, 1996 
Ou Friday, August 2, 1996, I received a Fax from Mr. Watson's 
attorney, Douglas S. Haymore II• After reviewing copies of the 
petitions Mr. Haymore had faxed to me, I specif ically recall 
signing these petition.© on behalf ot a. CPS worker (possibly H&llie 
Nicholls or Kim Asay). The CPS worker and Deputy County Attorney 
had prepared the information. The worker was unavailable/ and I 
was aeked to sign the petitions in order for the them to be filed 
in c* tixaely manner. X remember questioning the Deputy County 
Attorney regarding the accurateness of the information presented in 
the petitions, and he informed me it wae correct. 
Because X did not: have direct involv©s»nt with this case, I Still 
do not foal comfortable in providing further information about 
myself to Mr. Watson's attorney, 
Thartk you £o*r forwarding this information, on to Mr* Haymore* 
Sent by: DAVID WATSON 7023560346 08/20/96 21:42 Job 166 Page 4/8 
HUU-^-M-b ibJH,' FROM MEIL B. CRIST, ATTORNEY TO 17023560346 P.05 
Ft! r-
IN TKS FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT MAY 1 1 }$$£ 
COUNTY Of UTAH, STATfcJ OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest-, of 
WATSON, l.indscy 05-31-8 1 ; P K T I T I O N 
WATSON, McCadu 03-18-90 
Children under IS years o£ age. ; 
COMES NOW Sherry Aivsri, Social Worker with the Utan State? 
Division of Family Services, Office of Social Services, Ptovo, 
Utah, who ond^r oach depos»e3 anc3 seys : 
1. Lindsey Watson IS 3 J2~y**ar-old f«maU chiia having t?u'r, 
born May 31, 1981; MoCad« Wgtaon i« o 4—yeat-ald nia ie child 
having been born March 18r 199Q. 
2. The natural mothar of Ljndsoy ie <Joced!ied'» Vh« HiLuial 
ot McCade is Suzanne Watson who resides at 9015 North 6800 West, 
American Fock/ Utah. The natural fathe tot the above named 
v-hllUrtsn la povio w^iwun wno can bo located through Sotnuol u. 
HcV&V or Daniel V. nor>rU,»l 1 ^ M m D ^ c p^ r- M*. c>i*«t--^ r ~*. I«<JC 
East Fagieyst* Tower, 60 Lflot South Temple, Salt L<>ke City, Utah 
84111-
3. On or about the l?th day of March, 1994, Lindsay alleged 
that she *«» sjexgolly abuutfd by tier jrainer oy tne use ot a 
vibrator ttcCdde cisclossd that his brother had touched his 
penis-
4. The parents are currently in a divorce proc*adin<3 end 
caseworkacs are concerned that the children nay be subjected to 
irn<lue influence irom cither or both parents. 
— *y-^™«™™,..70*™™i^.. _ _ « ° f / a o , ~ a 1 ' 4 3 J . ° < b u J ^ * ™ a c j e 5 / 8 
WHEREFOtlE, Petitioner raap#ri-faUy prayaa 
X. Tnat the Court find said children to be deperdcat 
children pursuant to the provisions of 76-30-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 195 3 as amended. 
2 That protective supervision of $aid chiidre;i be awdrdc: 
to the Utdh State Division of Faxmiy Services. 
Dared this ,// day of May, 195M. 
jQLzJL^^ 
PETTTLONER 
JU-C , 
Subscribed and sworn to before jne this //L day of May, 
1S94. -***— 
CLKKK 
TOTRL P.07 
Sent by: DAVID WATSON 7023560346 08/20/96 21:43 Job 166 Page 6/8 
HU3-02 -LHMD lt^GS FROM NEIL B, CRIST, ATTORNEY TO 170?73bO3J6 P 04 
IN THE JfOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT WAY I 1 jcc 
COUNTY OF UTAHf STATE' OF UTAH ^unrTb.i 7 
STATS OF UTAH, m che I n t e r e s t : o€ s 
WATSON, S c o t t 0 1 - 2 2 - 7 9 : PETITION 
A person under 18 years oC aye. ? 
COMES NOV/ Sherry Alvari, Social Worker with the Utah State 
D i v i s i o n o£ Fawixly S ** zr v i, <^ *&», 0££i.< -^ei SAJL S o c i a l Sc irvig«9 ; r r g v c , 
Utah, who under oath deposes and says* 
JL Scott: W»tsi?n i v A l b - y o a r - e l ^ male ch i Ld ht» *-\n<£ &<?<- \ 
oorn on January 22, 1979. 
2, Scott's natural no the r is deceased. Sco-tL-'-s—natura 1 
fdthor is David Watson who can be located through Samuc. D. McVey 
or Daniel V* Goodsell, attorneys for Mr. Watson, at 1S00 t*s>;. 
Jaglegate Tower, 60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 
34111. 
3, On or about the 13th day of Apcii, 1994, Scott allied 
thai* his father has physically abused him on a number of 
occasions in the past, by strangling him and by sexually abusing 
kixin. Scott , iklso dxgtcl^'iA^i •• h* h h U ^t'Apmothpr , ^)?Annp W.itson 
grabs his genitals as a form of discipline* 
4, Scott has rerused to reside with his father or hi«s 
•stepmother. His stepmother placed Scott in Uivendoli becd'jse 
th«y could not control him. The Director of River.delt Has 
\r\rtirr\tKc\ that his faciliLy is not an ojpyxypudtp placement for 
Scott, 
Sent by: DAVID WArSON ,023560346 08/20/96 21:44 f » ™ ^
 p J**** "* 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays: 
I. That the Court find said child to be n dependent en;Id 
pursuant to the provisions of 78-3a-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. 
2+ That temporary caro, custody, control and guardianship 
gf said child be awarded to the Utah jitau Division of Family 
Services. 
Daz&d this /'.,., day of May, 1994 
PETITIONER 
JUo fljUXAt 
DEPUTE COUNTY AfTO£ 
Subscribed and svocn to before me this // day of May, 
ism. 
CLERK 
Tab 8 
WL-
• I T T L I H B M V S~T A IT E M B ~ V T 
I* 
FflA 
VA 5 , 
7 a 3«_X_ C o n v . U n i n s . 
c o n v . I n s . 
FU* Mumb*r 
4 3 6 1 9 
£ O « A Kuober 
2 6 0 2 6 4 7 
«tg.!<*.C*M« 
:. MOTBf This form is furnished to give you A etetaoent of actual settlement ©oata. Amount* 
jaid to end by the settlement agent are shown, items narked "(p.o.c,)" were p*id 
Mtside the closing* they ere shown here for information purpoees and are not Included 
fa thft totmlAt 
t. MMB/fiPOTW 9r i w r n a L CTVIH B. BARDSLBY 
B I 0 1 J . BARDSLBY 
133 B a s t 1600 S o u t h 
) r e a , Utah S405S 
K . MUCB/ar^r^rT O F fffitfilR 
JAMBS 6 . PROCTOR, TRUST*! 
% 50 W. L i b e r t y S t . , S t e ISO 
Reno, Nevada 8*601 
F . MAMS & APDRBSS OF LPfPCt 
MS* AMERICA FINANCIAL, INC. 
2122 S a e t H i g h l a n d Ave . #445 
P h o e n i x , A r i z o n a 8S016 
1107 5 s o u t h L o a f e r Road 
teyeon, Utah 8 4 6 5 1 
SECURITY TXTLR « ABSTRACT CO. 
FLACS Or BTTTTitmMg 
SS B a s t C e n t e r S t r e e t 
P r o v e Utah 84601 
i . 
DATE 
5 / 1 3 / 9 6 
DISSORSS D A » 
5 / 1 5 / 9 6 ' 
7 . BTOOaXt OF BORROWER'S T R A M S A C T I O M K . BUlOtkRY 0 7 S B L L X R ' 8 TRAHflACTIOH 
LOO OBOfS AMOUR? DOB FROM OORRONSRS 400 CROSS AMOURT DUB TO SBLLKJtf 
IQt ggflftrsrt w i e g grigf 3 6 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 JrfPi confcjragt MM!*B arlcm 3 6 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
102 Ferso/ial groi>erty_ 
103 S^nl^^m, chMrn* /RUVOJ-) 
IM 
g.SvTtP? |40J 
1402 Pormon*! p r o p e r t y 
W l 
J££. X 
fcdjustaents for items 
la advance* 
paid by seller {Adjustments for items 
{in advance. 
paid by seller 
106 Citr texea to 
107 County cajr to 
\<Qi QitT *** 
Ifgf gqwifer fa* 
;o?_ 
jfcSL. \4Q9 AlftHCTYflt 
L£J2Z_ 
iKL JiiiL 
LLL J i l L 
120 OROBS AMOU1IT DOB FROM BOXROMBRSt 
373.SS7.Q7 
J420 S AMOUR* DUB FROM SRLLBRSs 
3 6 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2QO Aioiinfcii o a l d b v o r m b e h a l f o f b o r r o w t r i 1300 R e d u c t i o n s in amount d u e s e l l e r : 
201 Dapoaifc* or a a r n a a t money 2 . 0 0 0 , 0 0 1301 Kxcoaa dcponlte 
202 Principal mmount/now loon 2 7 3 . 7 5 0 , 0 0 !SP2 B a t t l e m e n t e h a r o e / a e l l e r l f i .U7.59 
1Q2 Afrittlas l9*n /fttfrf f t to !*01 **JMtLJj*a l»*n/*ubi*Ci: t o 
£Q£_ 1504 F a v o r * QWTML W f i 140 .327 .54 
MJL. \ m nntl—MMEST tfTff 1 6 4 . 6 5 0 . 8 1 
206_ IS06 199$ Taxm* 27.08 
W- im ZQJL \m 1122. 
Rdlwtwrts fox a w tmr 
11Q Ciaf t i W tO 
idjfcc • B U S T I iMittttpeofff for U f i f 
I gig City tares 
u n p a i d , b r ^ a J J j a X i . 
212. 
2U. 
Cfrttntr ts* to mtm 1.Q27.47 Iffll Coanty CM ftM/M- l i Q 2 7 , 4 7 tortganftttt tfi. lg» niataaacnt 
IJIJ ^o>y> IPgfOP 
i l l . 
aMJL 
^20 
IffH LftBRY VEST - B 1 U S 
ISM KSCROW FOR R E P A I R S 
3°vtSg 
1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
IgZf 
JILL. 
300 
jnOTAt FAXD FT OR FDR 
eVfflgy«f 
AT TO / FROM BUYBRftt 
1520 TOTAL RBDUCTIOR AMOUNT 
2 7 6 . 7 7 7 . 4 7 1 PffB fiffldJffif 
jSOO CASS AX 333,15?,?? 
301 Oroff* a o o u n t a p a i d by ISOI 9romm amount due t o 
3 7 3 . 8 6 7 . 0 7 ! fffiagr f ^ J W W ) 3efr.PP0.oQ 
302 
30S 
£ # « « a j soont s pmid by 
borrow* tlin* 220) 
C**K [Z FROM] t VOJ 
BOBROoTHRfls 
I f 0 2 £ e # s t o t a i reduction* in 
27<!f.777i47 I saotfut; rfBt figiZtfriXflp g2 
?7,Qg?,^P 
IS02 CASH [ Z TO} [ FROM] 
IHffiMEPl 
333.153,95 
3A|g4*»Q5 
rfi; X5&X9JL 
« tftf F " « * « « « orleml 
H3tm*o<> 4* 
14.20C.OO to oanvati REAL ESTATE LSMM 2.000.00 1 4 . 2 0 0 . 0 0 
JUL. 
too mmm* wp™*** r» 
Wl So*/* QTiQn £** 
* * * • LOAM 
1.000% coo imy MORTCACK , 2 , 7 3 7 . 9 9 . 
102 Lomn D±moount_ Q*QQQ\ 
^04 Cr*dL* g#gort to cooyrar jfojersxa 
poo" 
20Z. 
,400.^LQ. 
^ 0 , 0 0 
rl#Jrf rnmiam to C0CKT*r MORTOAGg £*<m Lmndmr- SI.710.94. 
Pr*c«MM±A4M fm to COWfTRT HtlttrOkOR 330 ,00 
409 Tm* m*r*±ce f## to UEW AKKRTCA FIXAMCIAL • j y . p Q 
g99 QPWTlir f t t t g 00VHTKI MOffiKflOT 25 .90 
Mil an**M>i±in* Wmm to MKW AM**1CA FTKAMCTAZ. 
912 Plood C**t±fic*t±Oa to MEW AMKBTCM MtAVCTAL 
30Q.QQ 
j2£U4fL 
*o,QQ-
ooo rttatg Mgnytimft IIT P " " " ™ »• PAID
 im ADVAMTX 
901 Intmmt 3/13/96 to 6/1/96 f f f f J j L 
9QZ fftfft JLnt- pr*mn • flgflfc&Yg) 
^ 1 3 1 - 5 6 
903 B*x*m l u g , ormm. 
904 i rwru JlprAygy ,gg» •L?2.vflfl, 
K i 
loop MBnvM w m i i f l ) w « u m n n 
1001 tt*»m*$ | y t t r . H f l i JUS2. „gtf«flg otc mouth 33Q.25 
1003 Jft»»»g f frg ^ y f ^ M - * 2 - Pff «flSft -
1003 C±t* o r o n a r t r fc«* J t t - pir amtA 
1004 CottHtr proi>orty t a x JLlfQ 231.00 OT month 1 .848 .00 
1005 Anmuml mmmmmmmmntm 
_J12_ 
1008 Aaor^omtf AeaxiAtl** A t f f n , , , ^ ^ 
1100 ItTfSM OBlff lM 
g»f aaatA 
{fiP7.2Q-
1191 ftstmntISlotlM it* fig WCT1I1T TTTHr i •MTfJCT go ,267i50 2*7t50 
12(73 Titit tximinitivn ML. 
iaTgrf LUlt I n a u r w fr^ntf** to 
11 OS Doonaaaim p r e p a r a t i o n 
mi mirr rtf tft mr Mmira ryfTOi'it 
159.00 
1107 I t ^ ^ v ^ i fmmm 
-£ft-
flncludmm Ahav» itmmm *n. t 
t7*f Tltlt iflIHfaVlf?# to CTCVMTI TITO* * AMCTHfit tal 764.00 
^i^iurfo^ ifrgrr .IfiMg r^if 
1/0* Laaifr*a eov^raaa ^ 273.7SO.00 
1 - S 4 5 . 0 0 
i l j g Pwwr^jf g g r a i g f f 35gi900iQ0 
uil gntf9«Mwtntf 1112 itt+fMA ffygffgi ^ggt » < .1*1. 55.00 2»tQ0 
l2fifijKZn 
oHftfg ^9tPP fftg. 2QrQQ 4 0 . 0 0 
UW AaTfIffngMflt J f t l Qt00 
1^3 Cifeif/eonaey tmx/artAatpai P—rf 
flri, fQ.CKL 
ffta ff.ffg 
80t09 
1204 Btmtm/tftftmom*D++it titg QM 
poo immwmu. 1301 Suxirm* CTMrrgr 
-££_ 
1J03 #*afe y f i f g ^ ^ i a / t J ^ . 
X22i. 
.?,867.07 ^ • ^ 7 . 5 9 
CTRTIFICATIOaf 
t havo earafuity rtvlenad tho WD-1 otttloaanc ttatoaant and to the beat of ay knonitdft and bo(Uf« ft f t a true and accurata 
ttataaant Of a i l raeoipto and dftburaaaanta oode on ay aooaunt or by aa In diia transaction, t further cert i fy tfeet 1 havo 
rooofvad a oopy of tho f*J»~1 oottlapant atatoaont. 
aajllttTS 
TO too boat of ay 
transaction. I Hi 
SECURITY TITLE 
fiZ. 
, tho IUD-1 ScttUaur* ttataaant «*lah 1 ba«a praparad fa a true and accurate 
or wUl M U M too funds to bt dfafauroed in amiwdanca with thfa atataaam. 
of thia 
« ABSTRACT CO. 
D4Lft Jfay 10. 1996 
uaajtittfis i t f t m crim to knoufr^ly aote falao ttatoxmtt to the United ttataa on thfa or any other siaUar for * . PensUlea 
upon oomnction con Include o Hm and laprttonaant. For datoUa too: T t t U 1 i ».«• Coda Sectfon 1001 and section 1010. 
TOTAL P. 03 
Tab 9 
U . S . DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
S E T T L E M E N T S T A T E M E N T 
h/S 
FHA 
VA 
2 
5 . " 
Fm 3 . X_ Con" U n i n s . 
Conv I n s . 
File Number 
4 4 9 9 3 
Loan Number 
0 8 5 6 1 6 9 5 
Mtg Ins Cisc* 
C NOTE: This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs Amounts 
paid to and by the settlement agent are shown. Item9 marked "(P-o c )" were paid 
outSLde the closing* they are shown hr»re for information purposes and are not included 
in the totals. 
P. NAME/ADDRESS OF BORROWER 
BRUCE FAWSON 
CHRISTINE FAWSON 
f>?l\ South 1300 Wpnt 
Mur ray, I'Lah 
O. P^OPRRTY LOCATION 
l()»l r) Sout h 1600 Wont 
f I k FlnUjo, U t a h fMGSl 
_E NAME/ADDRESS OF SELLER 
JAMES S PROCTOR, TRUSTEE 
SU7ANNE NFOFKFR 
ISO W Liborty SI , Ste 150 
Rono, N P V H U 89S01 
NAME & ADDRESS OF LENDER 
FIRST HOME MORTGAGE CORP. 
966 East 200 North 
SprmgvLlle, Utah 84663 
II. SETTLEMFNT AOFNT 
s i c imnY u r i r & AHSIRACI CO 
J . SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S TRANSACTION 
100 GROSS" AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWER 
101 Contract sales pi ice | 3 7 l> , 0U0 . 0 0 
102 Potsonal property 
103 Settlement cliaige (Buyer) | 3 , / M ._1_4__ 
104 
PLACE OF SETTLEMENT 
r>S Fant C e n t e r S t i o o t 
P rove- , U t a h jMGOl 
K. SUMMARY OF SELLER'S TRANSACTION 
I SETTLEMFNT 
DATE 
1 / 7 8 / 9 G 
DISBURSE DATE 
3 / 7 9 / 9 6 
\400 GROSS AMOUNT DUE lO SELI ER• 
105 
Adjustments for items paid by seller 
in advance. 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
120 
City taxes 
County tax to 
Assessments to 
GROSS AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWERS-
328,774.14 
200 
201 
202 
203_ 
204 
205 
206 
207 
208 
Amounts paid by or in behalf of borrower: 
Deposits or earnest money 
Principal amount/new loan 
Existing loan /subiect to 
2,000.00 
150,000.00 
Adiustments for items unpaid by seller; 
210 City taxes to 
211 
212 
213 
County tax to 3/29/96 
Assessment to 
214 
215 
216 
217 
220 TOTAL PAID BY OR FOR 
BORROWER: 
5 1 9 . 1 6 
1 5 2 , 5 1 9 . 1 6 
300 CASH AT SETTLEMENT TO / FROM BUYERS: 
301 
302 
Gross amounts paid by 
Borrower (line 120) 
Less amounts paid by 
borrower (line 2201 
328,774 . 14 
152.519.16 
401 _ _ C o n t i a c t _ s a l e s pt ic_o 
l02__P_ersonal pi_opeiJ-J 
403 
404 
3 7 5,000_._0_0_ 
Adjustments for items paid by seller 
in advance. 
406 City tax 
407 County Tax 
408 Assessment 
409 
410 
411 
420 GROSS AMOUNT DUE FROM SELLERS: 
3 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
500 R e d u c t i o n s In amount d u e s e l l e r : 
501 Excess deposits 
502 Settlement charge/seller 
503 Existing loan/subiect to 
504 Payoff CHASE MANHATTAN 
505 Payoff CENTRAL BANK 
506 1995 Taxes 
507 Shapiro & Miles 
508 Strawberry Water Assessme 
509 Strawberry Highlme Canal 
1 4 , 7 6 7 . 5 0 
1 3 3 , 4 8 3 . 5 0 
1 2 6 , 2 5 0 . 4 8 
1 , 2 3 0 . 9 3 
7 1 0 . 0 0 
2 1 . 5 4 
9 6 2 . 3 4 
A d j u s t m e n t s f o r I t e m s u n p a i d by s e l l e r : 
510 City taxes 
511 County tax 3/29/96 
512 Assessment 
513 H.O.W, 
514 
516 
517 
520 TOTAL REDUCTION AMOUNT 
DUE SELLER: 
5 1 9 . 1 6 
2 7 7 , 9 4 5 . 4 5 
600 CASH AT SETTLEMENT TO / FROM SELLERS: 
601 Gross amount due t o 
Seller (Line 420) 
602 Less total reductions in 
amount due seller(line 52 
603 CASH [X TO] [ FROM] 
SELLER: 
3 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 7 7 . 9 4 5 . 4 5 
4 7 , 0 5 4 . 5 5 
"CJ\jliM(Mf ^a<j\')n 
| L . S E T T L E M E N T C H A R G E S 
1700 TOTAL SALES COMMISSION 325.000.00 4% 
1 (Based on the purchase price) 
1 Division of commission (line 700. as follows: 
1 13,000.00 to OSMOND REAL ESTATE Less 2,000.00 
1 to 
PAID FROM 
BORROWERS FUND 
AT SETTLEMENT 
PA 10 FROM j 
SELLERS FUNDS) 
AT SETTLEMENT] 
13,000.00 
• 800 ITEMS PAYABLE IN CONNECTION VM TH LOAN 1 
leOl Loan Oriq. fee 0.750% ]st HOME MORTGAGE 
1802 Loan Discount 0.000% 
I 803 Appraisal fee to 
1804 Credit Report to 1st HOME MORTGAGE (POC $45.00) 
\805 Lender's inspection fee 
1806 Mortaaae insurance fee 
I 807 UnderwritinQ Fee to ACCUBANC MORTGAGE CORP. 
1808 Tax service fee to FIRST AMERICAN REAL ESTATE TAX SERVICE 
1809 Flood Certification to NATIOMAL FLOOD CERTIFICATION SER. 
\dl0 Courier Fee to ACCUBANC MORTGAGE CORP. 
1811 Fundina Fee to ACCUBANC MORTGAGE CORP. 
1 812 Yield Spread Premium to 1st I'ome Mta - $1,687.50 POC 
1 1,125.00 
150.00 
58.00 
| 18.00 
j 22.50 
100.00 
1900 ITEMS REQUIRED BY LENDER TO Bl! PAID IN ADVANCE 1 
|90i Interest 3/29/96 to - /1196 0 $32.88 
1902 MtQ. ins, prern. Month(s) 
1903 Hazard ins. prem. 1 Year(s) FARM BUREAU 
I 904 I 905 
1 98.64 
395.00 
I1000 RESERVES DEPOSITED WITH LENDER 1 
11001 Hazard insurance 2 Mo 32.92 per month 
11002 Mortaaae insurance Mo per month 
11003 City property tax Mo per month 
11004 County property tax 6 Mo 180.00 per month 
11005 Annual assessments Mo per month 
\l008 Aqpreaate Credit 
65.84 
1,080.00 
(263.34) 
jiiOO TITLE CHARGES 1 
1 HO] Settlement/closina fee to SECURITY TITLE & ABSTRACT CO 
11102 Abstract / title search to 
\1103 Title examination to 
11104 Title insurance binder to 
\ll05 Document preparation to ACCUBANC MORTGAGE CORP. 
Iii06 Notary fees to 
\ll07 Attorney's fees to 
1 (includes above items No.: 
11108 Title insurance to SECURITY TITLE & ABSTRACT CO 
1 (includes above items No.: 
\ll09 Lender's coveraqe $ 150,000.00 
liHO Owner's coveraae $ 325.000.00 
l l l l l Endorsements 100, 116 8.1 
I 1112 Federal Express 
197.50 
100.00 
510.00 
55.00 
197.50 1 
1,425.00 
50.00 J 
1 1200 GOVERNMENT RECORDING AND TRANSFER CHARGES 1 
11201 Recordina fee: Deeds 50.00 Mta. 25.00 j 
\l202 Assianment $12> POA 0.00 Rel. 70.00 1 
1 1203 City/county tax/stamps: Deed Mta 0.00 
\l204 State/stamps:Deed Mta 0.00 
50.00 1 
12.00 | 
25.00 I 
70.00 1 
11300 ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT CHARGES 1 
1301 Survey to 
[J302 Pest inspection to 
\l303 
[ 1400 TOTAL SETTLEMENT CHARGES 3,774.14 j 14,767.50 j 
CERTIFICATION 
l have careful ly reviewed>*Ke HUJvl Settlement Statement and to the best of my knowledge and be l i e f , i t is a true and accurate 
statemo^fof a l l receipt* an^tlisbursements made on my account or by me in this transaction. I further c e r t i f y that I have 
received p copy, of the^TOCFI settlement statement. 
Borrowers S e l l e r s 
To the best of my knowledge, the HUD-1 Settlement Statement which 1 have prepared is a true and accurate account of this 
transaction. I have caused or will cause the funds to be disbursed in accordance with this statement. 
SEODKITY TITLEsfi, ABSVRAC? bo. 
Date: March 28, 1996 
\H£:/lY is a crime to knowingly make false statements to the United States on this or any other similar form. Penalties 
conviction can include a fine and imprisonment. For details see: Title 18 U.S. Code Section 1001 and Section 1010. 
